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ABSTRACT
SAFETY CULTURE MONITORING:
A MANAGEMENT APPROACH FOR ASSESSING NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE
HEALTH PERFORMANCE UTILIZING MULTIPLE-CRITERIA DECISION
ANALYSIS
James H. Warren, Jr.
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. Adrian Gheorghe

Nuclear power plants are among the most technologically complex of all energy
facilities. This complexity reflects the precision needed in design, maintenance and
operations to harness the energy of the atom safely, reliably and economically. Nuclear
energy thus requires consistent, high levels of organizational performance by the highly
skilled professionals who operate and maintain nuclear power plants (Nuclear Energy
Institute [NEI], 2014, p. 1).
A key element for achieving consistent, high levels of performance in a nuclear
organization is its safety culture. Nuclear safety culture is for an organization what
character and personality is for an individual: a feature that is made visible primarily
through behaviors and espoused values. Nuclear safety culture is undergoing constant
change. It represents the collective behaviors of the organization, which change as the
organization and its members change and apply themselves to their daily activities. As
problems arise, the organization learns from them. Successes and failures become
ingrained in the organization’s nuclear safety culture and form the basis on which the
organization conducts business. These behaviors are taught to new members of the
organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act and feel (NEI, 2014, p. 1).

Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) is defined as the core values and behaviors resulting from
a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing
goals to ensure protection of people and the environment (Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations [INPO], 2012a, p. iv). Thus, nuclear safety culture depends on every
employee, from the board of directors, to the control room operator, to the field
technician in the switchyard, to the security officers and to contractors on site. That is,
nuclear safety culture is affected by everything we say and everything we do. Nuclear
safety is a collective responsibility meaning no one in the organization is exempt from the
obligation to ensure nuclear safety first (NEI, 2014, p. 1).
Furthermore, NSC is a leadership responsibility. Leaders reinforce safety culture
at every opportunity so that the health of safety culture is not taken for granted. Leaders
frequently measure the health of safety culture with a focus on trends rather than absolute
values. Leaders communicate what constitutes a healthy safety culture and ensure
everyone understands his or her role in its promotion. Leaders recognize that safety
culture is not all or nothing but is, rather, constantly moving along a continuum. As a
result, there is a comfort in discussing safety culture within the organization as well as
with outside groups, such as regulatory agencies (INPO, 2012a). That is, NSC like
everything else rises and falls based on leadership (Maxwell, 1998).
In order to facilitate a healthy NSC, which is the sine qua non of safe nuclear
plant operation, the leadership team needs to understand its present health in order to
address NSC issues. It has been said “To manage risk, one has first to comprehend it”
(Gheorghe, 2005, p. xvii). Equally true, in order to manage the nuclear safety culture of
an organization we must first comprehend it.

The goal of this research is to provide an ongoing holistic, objective, transparent
and safety-focused process to identify early indications of potential problems linked to
culture. The process uses a cross-section of available data (e.g., the corrective action program, performance trends, NRC inspections, industry evaluations, nuclear safety culture
assessments, self-assessments, audits, operating experience, workforce issues and
employee concerns program and other process inputs). These data are then analyzed
utilizing Multiple-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) methodology that incorporates
belief degrees of the management team leading to insights about its meaning which may
lead directly to corrective actions.
.
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This dissertation is dedicated to the courageous staff at the Japanese Fukushima
Daiichi plants who, through tireless personal effort and exceptional resourcefulness, were
able to reduce the magnitude of the release of radioactive contamination to the general
population and environment from the nuclear reactor fuel that was damaged as a result of
a beyond design basis Tsunami. Furthermore, they loyally performed their duties while
not knowing what personal loss the Tsunami had caused to their own families. By their
professionalism, initiative and loyal devotion to duty, while facing insurmountable odds,
these workers modeled the highest regard for the Nuclear Safety Culture.
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CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Designed, built, and operated to produce electricity, commercial nuclear power
plants consist of complex technologies operating in a complex regulatory environment
(Wells, 2010). The technical challenges inherent in the design are confronted by
economic demands, mainly due to changes in the circumstances of the energy industry
(Itoigawa, Wilpert & Fahlbruch, 2005). The nuclear power industry has been challenged
by changing circumstances, including governmental pressures to deregulate energy
markets, increases in company mergers, organizational cost-saving strategies, and the
replacement of aging technical components with newer and more costly technologies
(Itoigawa et al., 2005). Competitive business pressures appear to have been compelling
the nuclear power industry to improve delivered value and the processes that deliver
value, which can affect the NSC through increased risk (Gheorghe, 2006).
Nuclear power is a complex technology for electrical power generation (Wells,
2010). Commercial nuclear power plants consist of redundant systems that force a
nuclear reactor shutdown when temperatures and pressures exceed design basis limits
(McAvoy & Rosenthal, 2005). These systems are designed to prevent core damage and
resultant potential radiological hazards to the surrounding environments. The technical
challenges created by a need to ensure safe operations and to prevent the introduction of
radioactive materials into the external environment have been a necessary element in the
commercial nuclear industry since its beginnings (McAvoy & Rosenthal, 2005).
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Researchers have observed that this complex technology is being confronted by
additional challenges and demands, including increased competitiveness among nuclear
operating companies, intensified cost-saving strategies, and the replacement of original
technical components due to natural aging with newer and more costly technologies
(Itoigawa et al., 2005).
Although commercial nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) historically
have had a reasonable record of safe operations (Langston, 2005; U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 2009), events in the global nuclear industry have influenced
conceptualization of nuclear safety cultures. The industry had its first significant safety
culture incident in 1979 as a result of an accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power
Plant in the United States (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2004). The importance
of maintaining strong cultural attributes related to nuclear safety was reinforced after the
1986 event at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 1988). According to industry researchers, one critical factor essential to
a strong nuclear safety culture was a nuclear business acumen, which included the ability
to manage the unique interaction of risks from technology, economics, human factors,
and safety in a changing nuclear business environment (Wilpert & Itoigawa, 2001).
Furthermore, when applying processes to improve value and control costs, key
organizational factors could be affected, specifically allocation o f resources and work.
Corcoran implied that application of improvement processes could affect the nuclear
power plant's institutions by which the work organizations perform its activities involved
with nuclear safety (Corcoran, 2010).
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1.2 Problem
On April 26, 1986, reactor number four at the Ukrainian Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant exploded resulting in large geographical areas being contaminated, deaths
and mass relocation of an entire city population. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
accident provided a watershed event leading to the studies of a nuclear safety culture
concept. Researchers developed the concept of a nuclear safety culture in the aftermath
of this nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. However, the industry
had its first significant safety culture incident in 1979 as a result of the accident at the
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant in the United States. The accident was
caused by a combination of personnel errors, design deficiencies, and component failures.
In the aftermath of the nuclear accident at the United State (US) Three Mile Island (TMI)
Nuclear Plant in 1979 there has been controversy as to whether the commercial use of
nuclear power is safe for the generation of electricity (Gheorghe & Muresan, 2011). In
fact, this one nuclear accident resulted in a moratorium on new nuclear plant construction
for nearly three decades in the United States. Furthermore, this concern for safety was
bolstered by the nuclear accident at Russia’s Chernobyl Nuclear Plant in 1986 and again
recently by the nuclear accidents at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear multi-plant
site in 2011 (Gheorghe & Muresan, 2011). What is not widely known, outside of the
nuclear industry, is that after the Chernobyl nuclear accident the US nuclear industry
along with its civilian governance organization (i.e., the Institute for Nuclear Power
Operation or INPO) and its US government regulator (i.e., Nuclear Regulatory
Commission or NRC) have worked relentlessly to establish a robust and pervasive
nuclear safety culture (NSC).
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The NRC defines Nuclear Safety Culture as: “The core values and behaviors
resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety
over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment (NRC-20100282, Final Safety Culture Policy Statement, 2011). It is this Nuclear Safety Culture in
the US Nuclear Power Plants that has played a significant role in reducing the risk of a
nuclear accident as demonstrated by zero nuclear accidents in the US subsequent to TMI.
In order to facilitate a healthy NSC, which is the sine qua non of safe nuclear
plant operation, the leadership team needs to understand its present health in order to
address NSC issues. The volumes of literature on these nuclear accidents; however, has
dealt almost exclusively with technical, radiological, and environmental issues. No
research was located that studied utilized Multiple-Criteria Decision Analysis
Methodology (MCDA) to determine the health performance of a NSC. This research will
be conducted to bridge a gap in knowledge and to supplement the body of knowledge
with respect to NSC health utilizing a MCDA methodology.

1.3 Purpose
If an excellent NSC is not maintained, then another nuclear accident might occur
at a nuclear power plant, utilized for the commercial generation of electricity in the US,
which could result in the end of the commercial use of nuclear power to generate
electricity in the US.
The health of the NSC is a function of our belief and those beliefs can influence
our understanding. In addition, our belief may not always agree with the results of our
NSC assessments. Some assessments rely solely on belief in order to qualify or quantify
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the health of the NSC while others seek to exclude degrees of belief altogether by relying
exclusively on objective data. Multiple assessments that seek to assess the health
performance of a NSC in a specific organization could vary widely due to being based on
tangible data or intangible data (e.g., belief).
Rather than fault the subjectivity of our degrees of belief of the health
performance of a NSC, or confuse our objective assessments with personal opinions, it is
proposed that we integrate our belief as a unique component of NSC health assessments.
Consequently, a MCDA based process is proposed in this dissertation to systematically
collect and integrate assessments of NSC in a manner that so that each dimension can be
explored uniquely, and such that all components can be aggregated into an overall health
assessment in a systematic, transparent, traceable, and reproducible manner.
Consequently, the purpose of this research study is to evaluate NSC health as a
function of belief, quantified as degrees of belief, and tangible inputs integrated with
MCDA in order to reduce the subjectivity of NSC assessments. Some assessments rely
on degrees of belief from subject matter experts (SME) in order to qualify or quantify.
Others exclude degrees of belief altogether, relying on objective data, if available. Rather
than fault the subjectivity of our belief, or dilute objective assessments with personal
opinions, it is logical to embrace our belief of the health performance of a NSC, but
isolate and include them as a unique component of the NSC health assessment.
Again, a MCDA based NSC health assessment methodology is proposed by this
dissertation to systematically collect and integrate tangible indicators of NSC health
along with the intangible of our belief. Combined in a manner that each dimension can
be explored uniquely, and such that both components (tangibles and intangibles) can be
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integrated into an overall Nuclear Safety Culture Health assessment in a consistent and
reproducible manner (Figure 1). This NSC health assessment methodology draws from
the fields of nuclear engineering, systems engineering, and psychology to develop a
model that integrates the intangible of our belief with the various other tangible inputs
using Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA).

Figure 1. NSC Assessment with Proposed MCDA Process

The NSC Assessment with MCDA Process consists of three phases as illustrated
in Figure 2. The first phase is the Deterministic Phase where the process inputs are
evaluated and binned. The second phase consists of a Qualitative/Quantitative Survey
where upper management’s degrees of belief of the health of various NSC scenarios are
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assessed. The final phase is the assessment integration phase, where the binned process
inputs and the assessment of degrees of belief are both assimilated. These phases will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.

Deterministic Phase
(Process Inputs
Categorized)

Qualitative/
Quantitative Phase
(Degrees of Belief
Assessment Survey)

MCDA Phase
(Integration of process
inputs and degrees of
belief)

Figure 2. Three Phases of the NSC Assessment with MCDA Process

The purpose of this research, as illustrated in Figure 3, is three-fold. First, it is
necessary to determine how to assess the belief of NSC Health for a given scenario. We
are less concerned with the degrees of belief data, itself, or even with which method is
considered the best way to collect the belief data; rather, we are concerned with
integrating degrees of belief data with binned Process Input data. It is assumed that data
for the Process Inputs and even degrees of belief could be leveraged from previous
assessments, collected as part of the research, or simulated, if necessary, in order to
demonstrate the viability of the NSC with MCDA methodology.
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Assess Degree of Belief for Health of NSC

Determine a methodology for integrating Process Inputs and
Degrees of Belief assessments

Characterize the Health of a NSC based on integrated NSC
MCDA assessment methodology

Figure 3. Research Purpose

Next, an integrated NSC with MCDA assessment methodology must be
researched. The belief is that the currently accepted NSC Assessment methodology of
simply binning and trending the process inputs is inadequate for characterizing health of
the NSC and that an integrated model should be explored to incorporate belief into the
current health assessment approach. However, precisely how those components of health
are integrated must be decided. The improved health assessment integration
methodology, based on the binned process inputs and degrees of belief assessments, will
be developed and presented. This methodology will systematically integrate both
assessments in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible approach. The end result will
be a health indicator of NSC, based on the NSC with MCDA methodology that will assist
organizational decision makers in assessing the health performance of an organization’s
NSC.
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1.4 Theoretical Framework
A brief literature review is provided to outline the basic concepts of a nuclear
safety culture. It was this review that provides the linkage from nuclear safety culture
theory and selection of the Nuclear Energy Institutes model for empirical
operationalization. Different methodologies used for analyses of safety cultures are
discussed. The need for additional studies in the field of nuclear safety culture health
assessment are identified and discussed.
Researchers developed the concept of a nuclear safety culture in the aftermath of
a nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (International
Atomic Energy Agency, 1988). On April 26, 1986, reactor number four at the Ukrainian
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded, which resulted in the top being torn from the
reactor and exposing the nuclear core (Medvedev, 1990). Large geographical areas were
badly contaminated, dozens of people died, and 336,000 people were evacuated and
resettled (Medvedev, 1990). Although the severity of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
accident may have been the catalyst for studies of a nuclear safety culture concept, the
industry had its first significant safety culture incident in 1979 as a result of the accident
at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in the United States (Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations, 2004). As explained by Itoigawa, Wilpert and Fahlbruch, the accident
at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania,
resulted in a partial meltdown of the reactor core (Itoigawa, Wilpert, & Fahlbruch, 2005).
The researchers determined the accident was caused by a combination of personnel
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errors, design deficiencies, and component failures. The extensive literature on these two
nuclear accidents, however, has dealt almost exclusively with technical, radiological, and
environmental issues. Researchers for the International Atomic Energy Agency studied
the concept of a nuclear safety culture after the Chernobyl accident and developed
common terms, definitions, and methods for assessment (International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA], 1988). Analysts at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations studied
nuclear power plant events and problems relating to shortfalls in a nuclear safety culture
(Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2003; Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations [INPO], 2004). Perin (2005) argued that a nuclear power plant culture
embodies several different cultures of control based on different methods of risk
assessment. For example, the commercial nuclear industry culture is organized around a
structured logic of command and control, which requires tradeoffs with a parallel logic of
problem identification and diagnosis. The two different intra-cultural logics have not
aligned in an environment of intense pressures relative to schedule, electricity output, and
reduction of operating costs. Dimensions of a nuclear safety culture may be defined by
multiple attributes and measured through multiple methods (Corcoran, 2010;
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2002). Researchers have typically
employed questionnaires and surveys to measure the attributes of leadership; worker and
manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors; and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress,
and decision-making, all of which have some relevance to worker performance and the
safety culture (Corcoran, 2010; Findley, 2004; Itoigawa et al., 2005; Reiman, 2007).
Other researchers have studied safety culture attitudes, values, and beliefs in other highrisk industries (Bums, 2005; Helrnreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 2006; Reason,
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1997). A nuclear safety culture may also be defined by specific observable physical
attributes (Corcoran, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2009). Observations
of human actions and physical objects, such as the quality of physical goods and archival
records, have been employed in some continuous improvement and safety culture studies
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Keating, Olivia, Repenning, Rockart, & Sterman, 1999).
Human observations have frequently been used in nuclear power plant studies because
the situation and resultant behaviors are not easily predictable (Corcoran, 2010; Institute
of Nuclear Power Operations, 2006). Nuclear safety culture researchers have focused on
the individual worker's commitment and performance based on attitudes, work
approaches, and communication systems (Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Reiman, 2007).
Reason and Hobbs (2003) concluded that the most common worker errors at nuclear
power plants were caused by failure to do something that should have been done rather
than doing something incorrectly. Some nuclear safety culture researchers have studied
other dimensions of the complex and dynamic interrelationships within the organizational
cultures at nuclear power plants. Findley (2004) and Matthews (2006) found that
organizational priorities were not always properly balanced between safety and
production and often safety cultures were constrained when production factors became
priorities over prevention factors. Reiman (2007) studied the maintenance organizations
at three European nuclear power plants and concluded that nuclear safety was affected if
the demands of the organizational task were not aligned with the dynamics of the
organization's culture. Researchers have stated common parallel underlying extended
shutdowns of U.S. nuclear power plants appeared to be the tension between increasing
economic and production pressures and diminishing safety culture margins (Institute of
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Nuc1ear Power Operations, 2003; Itoigawa et al., 2005). For example, in 1996 the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission directed Northeast Utilities to shut down the three
nuclear reactors at the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in Connecticut. Contributing to the
shutdown was diminishing safety culture margins exacerbated by competitive advantage
strategies (McAvoy & Rosenthal, 2005). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
directed closure of the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in 1997 because of cost
cutting measures at the expense of safety considerations (Jackson, 1997). A significant
operating event occurred in 2002 at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant when the
reactor pressure vessel head began to leak radioactive coolant (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 2002). Analysts at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (2002b)
concluded a major contributor to this event was a shift in focus at all organizational levels
from implementing high safety standards to justifying minimal safety standards. These
analysts stated that a reduction in standards resulted from excessive focus on meeting
short-term production goals. Within the high-risk industries of aviation and space
operations, medical surgery, chemical processing, and offshore drilling, more safety
culture studies have been conducted than in the nuclear industry. Researchers have
traced various efficiency and cost containment influences as sources of accidents
(Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald,
2006; Vaughan, 1996). Based on the accidents studied, a parallel was evident among
increasing production pressures and schedule conflicts and diminishing safety culture
margins. Corcoran (2010) stated that the concept of a nuclear safety culture could benefit
from more research and reflection.
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This research was conducted to bridge a gap in knowledge and to supplement the
body of knowledge on health evaluation with respect to nuclear safety cultures.

1.5 Research Questions
The research will seek to address the three questions presented in Figure 4. These
questions, and their associated assumptions, are the culmination of an intensive Literature
Review (Chapter 2) that highlighted a number of issues and questions that require
resolution in the field of Nuclear Safety Culture. The problem statement is reformulated
in this section as three questions this research effort attempts to answer. These questions
are presented to assist with delineating the scope of this research.
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Question 1

• How can quantitative data (i.e., Process
Inputs) be obtained at a Nuclear Power
Station that has causality with NSC health?

Question 2

• How can the degree of belief of NSC health
by leadership at a nuclear power station be
quantified for NSC Health?

Question 3

• How can MCDA be used to integrate the
degree of belief of NSC health and the
process inputs into a comprehensive
methodology to measure NSC Health
Performance?

Figure 4. Research Questions

Question 1
How can quantitative data (i.e., Process Inputs) be obtained at a Nuclear Power
Station that has causality with NSC health?

Question 2
How can the degrees of belief of NSC health by leadership at a nuclear power
station be quantified for NSC Health?
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Question 3
How can MCDA be used to integrate the degrees of belief of NSC health and the
process inputs into a comprehensive methodology to measure NSC Health Performance?

1.6 Nature of the Study
There are some limitations to this research related to data access or collection,
model selections, and technology. A degrees of belief assessment model must be
selected that will ultimately produce results compatible with the MCDA model selected.
Process Input data and degrees of belief data will need to be leveraged, collected, or
simulated, and again those data must be compatible with the selected MCDA model. A
MCDA model must be selected from a number of potential options. Finally, the research
is constrained by the technology available to conduct the assessments, as well as to
integrate the assessments during the third phase of the methodology.

1.7 Significance of the Study
There are two main contributions proposed for this research as illustrated in
Figure 5.
First, this research will present a MCDA model for integrating assessments of the
binned process inputs data and degrees of belief, incorporating them all into a NSC
Health assessment approach.
Second, this research will produce a methodology for deploying the NSC with a
MCDA model, to include a means for collecting degrees of belief data for a NSC and
then integrating it with the process input data.
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Contribution
1

Contribution
2
Present an MCDA
model for integrating
assessments of the
process inputs data
and degree of belief,
incorporating them
all into a NSC Health
Performance
assessment
approach.

Produce a
methodology for
deploying the NSC
with a MCDA model,
to include a means
for collecting degrees
of belief data for a
NSC and then
integrating it with the
process input data.

Figure 5. Research Contributions

1.8 Definitions
Many of the following definitions will be discussed in further detail in the
Literature Review. However, below is a list of terms and their intended meanings when
used throughout this research. Some of these definitions are extracted from the literature.
Others are modified from definitions provided in official, government documents. All of
these definitions, as they are presented here, reflect the intents and purposes of this
research.

Belief: An idea held to be true that may or may not be reflective of reality.
Consequence. Effect of a successful risk scenario on an asset. Consequence is
commonly assessed along four factors: human, economic, mission and psychological, but
may also include other factors such as impact on the environment; consequence can be
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measured quantitatively if data exist, but can also be measured qualitatively either along a
set of scales or along a single integrated consequence scale for which all consequence
factors are considered as a whole.
Credence. Mental acceptance as true or real.
Critical Infrastructure. Government and private systems essential to the operation of our
nation in any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health, safety, economy, etc.), such
as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc.
Event. Event is defined as an outcome, condition or eventuality that occurred during
some activity and resulted in challenges to safe plant operations (Adams, 2007).
Degrees of belief. The subjective interpretation of probability. Probability loosely
defined can then be said to be a measure of the degrees of belief (Ramsey, 1978).
Executives. Corporate decision makers who are responsible for setting the long-term
strategic goals for the organization; executives develop and implement corporate policies.
High-Risk. High-risk is defined as a hazardous activity or business venture where the
risk to human life is an essential part of the operation and a proper balance between
production and safety is required (Collins, 2005).
Independent Oversight Organizations. Groups that independently review the
performance and direction of the organization.
Individual Contributors. Individuals who operate individually or as members of work
groups to accomplish tasks; individual contributors may include leaders when leaders are
acting in a nonsupervisory capacity or are accomplishing tasks as members of a work
group.
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Individuals. All people at all levels of the organization; individuals include all leaders,
individual contributors, and supplemental personnel.
Leaders. Individuals who influence, coach, or lead others within the organization and
determine the vision, goals, or objectives of their teams; leaders include executives,
managers, supervisors, and others who influence individuals in the organization.
Managers. Individuals assigned to managerial positions who control, direct, guide and
advise; managers include senior managers, and may include some supervisors.
Multi-criteria Decision Analysis. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) is a discipline
that encompasses mathematics, management, informatics, psychology, social science and
economics. Its application is even wider as it can be used to solve any problem where a
significant decision needs to be made. These decisions can be either tactical or strategic,
depending on the time perspective of the consequences. MCDA methods provide
stepping-stones and techniques for finding a compromise solution. They have the
distinction of placing the decision maker at the centre of the process. They are not
automatable methods that lead to the same solution for every decision maker, but they
incorporate subjective information. Subjective information, also known as preference
information, is provided by the decision maker, which leads to the compromise solution.
Nuclear Safety Culture. (Previous definition from INPO) Nuclear safety culture is
defined as a nuclear organization's values and behaviors - modeled by its leaders and
internalized by its members - that serve to make nuclear safety its overriding priority
(Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2004).
Nuclear Safety Culture (INPO Definition). Nuclear safety culture is defined as the core
values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals
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to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the
environment (INPO, 2012a).
Nuclear Safety Culture (NRC Definition). The set of core values and behaviors resulting
from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over
competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment (NRC-2010-0282,
Final Safety Culture Policy Statement, 2011).
Nuclear Safety Culture Trait. A pattern of thinking, feeling and behaving such that safety
is emphasized over competing priorities.
Organizational Culture. Organizational culture is the shared basic assumptions that are
developed in an organization as it learns and copes with problems. The basic
assumptions that have worked well enough to be considered valid are taught to new
members of the organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act and feel. Culture is
the sum total of a group’s learning. Culture is for the group what character and
personality are for the individual (INPO, 2012a).
Process Inputs. The key data inputs to the nuclear safety culture monitoring process.
This data is gathered from various sources (see Section 3.4) including the nuclear power
plants' corrective action (incident) reporting systems, excluding proprietary, personal and
security safeguards documentary materials. For each input, there are data (e.g.,
deficiencies, violations, weaknesses, or strengths) that are reviewed in combination with
data from other inputs to determine whether there is a nuclear safety culture issue.
Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP). This consists of key site personnel that meet
periodically to review station performance and bin events and trends to the Traits for a
Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture. The primary function of the SCMP is to periodically
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assess nuclear safety culture trends and identify potential trends and/or emergent issues
then roll those up to the Safety Culture Review Team. This team consists of a supervisor
or individual contributor representative from each of the departments at the power
station. Consequently, the members of this team ensure the various sub-culture views at
a power station are expressed.
Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT). This is the management team that reviews the
results of the SCMP and takes corrective actions to address trends in the safety culture.
The primary function of the SCRT is to monitor and promote a healthy nuclear safety
culture by conducting a reflective self-critique of information that reflects the health of
the Station’s safety culture.
Senior Managers. Those managers who are responsible for the execution of business
activities, including setting priorities for and monitoring the performance of the
organization.
Supervisors. Individuals who provide direction of the day-to-day activities of individual
contributors; supervisors may include superintendents, foremen, or work group leads.
Supplemental Personnel. Individuals who accomplish work for but are not employees of
the organization; supplemental personnel include short- and long-term contractors and
individuals who are not employed by the organization but occasionally perform work
related to nuclear safety.
System of Systems. Possess the same definition as systems, but on a larger scale. For a
hierarchy of systems, in which systems are components or subsystems of other systems;
component systems each have a purpose of their own and would continue to operate even
if separated from the overall system. Each component system is managed individually,
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rather than being managed within the context of the entire system of systems. System of
systems often exhibit characteristics of complexity and widespread geographic
distribution. The combination of several interdependent CI showing the characteristics of
a single system, but lack an overarching management entity (Gheorghe, Masera, &
Voeller, 2008; Maier, 1998; Skyttner, 2005).
Systems. Comprised of interrelated or interdependent objects. Systems exhibit holistic
properties not necessarily evident at the level of individual objects or subsystems; seek to
achieve some final goal or state, and in order to reach this goal they transform inputs into
outputs; tend to devolve into entropy without regulation and are typically organized in a
hierarchical system of nested subsystems where the subsystems are specialized with
different functions within the system. Systems either diverge, in which case it has many
ways of achieving a single goal, or converge, where, from an initial state, it could achieve
many different goals (Skyttner, 2005).
The Organization. The collective group of all individuals, the reporting structure and the
procedures, policies, and practices that individuals use to set goals and make decisions, to
accomplish tasks and to implement and maintain a healthy nuclear safety culture.
Threat. The threat of a risk scenario to an asset. The threat of an intentional risk scenario
is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack (that accounts for both the intent and
capability of the adversary) being attempted by an adversary. For other risk scenarios,
threat is generally estimated as the likelihood that the risk scenario will manifest;
however, threat can also be estimated qualitatively as perceived likelihood.
True Belief. An idea held to be true (i.e., a belief) that is reflective of reality.
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Vulnerability. Ability of an asset to endure a risk scenario despite physical features,
operational attributes, characteristics of design, location, security posture, operation, or
any combination thereof that renders an asset open to exploitation or susceptible to a
given risk scenario. Vulnerability can be estimated qualitatively, or quantitatively, as the
likelihood of a successful risk scenario given the risk scenario is identified, which implies
that vulnerability is also related to resilience.
Work Groups. Groups of individuals who work collaboratively to accomplish tasks;
work groups may exist at any level of the organization.
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1.9 Summary
The technological complexities inherent in nuclear power plants to prevent reactor
core damage and potential radiological hazards, while ensuring continual operations to
support electricity generation, have been challenged by economic pressures to improve
the processes that deliver value by reducing production wastes and operating costs
(ltoigawa et al., 2005). Researchers have stated a common parallel underlying extended
shutdowns of U.S. Nuclear power plants appeared to be the tension between increasing
economic and production pressures and diminishing safety culture margins (Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations, 2003; Itoigawa et al., 2005).
The concept of a nuclear safety culture is complex and somewhat difficult to
comprehend. In fact, the literature on safety culture has demonstrated that the concept
includes many interrelated components and members of many organizations (Itoigawa et
al., 2005).
Organizational causes for nuclear power plant events and extended plant
shutdowns have been examined in the literature (Itoigawa et al., 2005), and in recent
years researchers have conducted studies examining precursors to these organizational
causes. These precursors typically have included various dimensions of leadership and
organizational behaviors. Several event investigations at U.S. nuclear power plants have
uncovered organizational flaws.
Organizational culture and nuclear management researchers have not adequately
studied the effect of degrees of belief of risk on the safety culture of a commercial
nuclear power plant. The literature on nuclear power plant accidents has dealt almost
exclusively with technical, radiological and environmental issues. This research
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attempted to bridge a gap in knowledge and to supplement the body of knowledge on
nuclear safety culture health measurement.
Within the next chapter of this dissertation, a review of organizational culture,
relevant safety culture literature and NSC health performance measurement is provided.
Since organizational culture and nuclear management literature have not adequately
addressed the effect of degrees of belief on a nuclear safety culture, this review included
literature in the area of a nuclear safety culture and safety cultures in other high-risk
industries, wherein the latter often focused on industrial safety cultures. As such, Chapter
2 has been divided into four subsections of prior studies to assist in comprehension of the
material: an overview of organizational culture, a safety culture relative to a nuclear
power plant safety culture, current trends in NSC performance measurement and a safety
culture relative to other high-risk industries.
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CHAPTER 2
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The foundational basis for this research comes from studies evaluating safety
cultures by industry, government and academic organizations. Researchers and theorists
have studied organizational culture concepts, staff and budget change processes, and the
effects of staff and budget change processes on organizational cultures. Consequently,
these topics were considered pertinent for this research. The factors that define and
influence any organizational culture have typically been viewed as difficult to quantify
and are normally formed over a long process of implementation by members of the
organization (Robbins, 2003).
This section has been divided into four subsections of prior studies to assist in
comprehension of the material: an overview of organizational culture, a safety culture
relative to a nuclear power plant safety culture, current trends in NSC performance
measurement and a safety culture relative to other high-risk industries. The high-risk
industries studies are not focused on nuclear safety cultures but rather industrial safety
cultures. However, there are similarities between an industrial safety culture and a NSC,
which will be discussed (Wells, 2010).

2.1 Organizational Culture
There seems to be wide agreement that organizational culture refers to a system of
shared meaning. This system of shared meaning is, on closer examination, a set of
key characteristics that the organization values. The research suggests that there are
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seven primary characteristics that, in aggregate, capture the essence of an
organization’s culture (Robbins, 2003, p. 525).

1. Innovation and risk taking. The degree to which employees are encouraged to
be innovative and take risks.
2. Attention to detail. The degree to which employees are expected to exhibit
precision, analysis and attention to detail.
3. Outcome orientation. The degree to which management focuses on results or
outcomes rather than on the techniques and processes used to achieve those
outcomes.
4. People orientation. The degree to which management decisions take into
consideration the effect of outcomes on people within the organization.
5. Team orientation. The degree to which work activities are organized around
teams rather than individuals.
6. Aggressiveness. The degree to which people are aggressive and competitive
rather than easy going.
7. Stability. The degree to which organizational activities emphasize
maintaining the status quo in contrast to growth.

Each of these characteristics exists on a continuum from low to high. Appraising
the organization on these seven characteristics, then, gives a composite picture of an
organization’s culture. This picture becomes the basis for feelings of shared
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understanding that members have about the organization, how things are done in it, and
the way members are supposed to behave (Robbins, 2003)
Furthermore, organizational culture has been conceptualized as a set of intangible
attributes, such as values, beliefs, assumptions, behaviors, degrees of beliefs and norms,
synergistically working with tangible attributes, such as customs, traditions, rituals and
shared group meanings (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). Some theorists have defined
organizational culture as shared meanings that group members assign to organizational
concepts and frameworks that are held in common. A definition of this type would
include Schein's (2004) assertion that the culture of a group includes patterns of
assumptions held in common that the group learned as it matured. Hofstede (n.d.)
defined organizational culture as the collective programming of the mind distinguishing
the members of one group from another. Others have defined organizational culture as
the shared meanings, behaviors, and assumptions aligned with the differences in
meanings, behaviors, and assumptions. For instance, Schneider (1990) maintained that
shared group behaviors and assumptions that prevail across the work environment would
be countered by individual behaviors and assumptions. Other dimensions and attributes
for organizational culture have been conceptualized (Wells, 2010). Cameron and Quinn
(2006) summarized the works of some culture researchers, specifically the studies
conducted by Martin (1992). Martin proposed three dimensions to an organizational
culture - integration, differentiation and fragmentation - that supposedly co-exist in all
organizations. The integration dimension was similar to Schein's (2004)
conceptualization that organizational culture was a set of shared meanings. The
differentiation dimension was similar to Schneider's (1990) conceptualization that
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organizational cultures were defined by the differences and conflicts between subgroups
within the organization. The fragmentation dimension was based on the assumption that
organizational cultures were ambiguous and unknowable. Cameron and Quinn (2006)
argued that culture cannot be described as an attribute of an organization since it was the
inherent in the organization itself. Wagner and Hollenbeck (2005) summarized other
perspectives and dimensions, including Hofstede's (n.d.) culture dimensions of power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity and Ernst's (2001)
perspective of an organizational culture grid, wherein people orientation (i.e.,
participative leadership) and response to the environment were the key cultural
dimensions. Kotter and Rathgeber (2005) argued that congruence was a key dimension
within organizational cultures. Hofstede (n.d.) documented that organizational cultures
differ mainly at the level of practices. Examples of practices included symbols and
rituals, process-oriented versus results-oriented perspectives, open systems versus closed
systems and tight versus loose controls. According to Hofstede (n.d.), since
organizational cultures were rooted in practices, they were somewhat more manageable
than national cultures which tended to be rooted in values. Based on additional studies,
the cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and
masculinity were amended to include a fifth dimension of long-term versus short-term
orientation (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004). A long-term orientation indicated values of
efficiency, stewardship, and perseverance, with an organizational mindset of
safeguarding the organization or group. A short-term orientation indicated values of
sustaining tradition, protecting a group's reputation, and meeting obligations (Wells,
2010). Although these two orientations have some relevance to functions within business
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organizations, application of orientation to business cultural practices was not clear. The
classical conceptualization of culture was viewed as a process within a non-equilibrium
state and included diagnosis as a key component for understanding an organization's
culture and eventually changing the culture to a desired state (Seel, 2000). Seel argued
that organizational culture should be considered an emergent result of conversations and
negotiations between members of an organization. The implications of this viewpoint
were that organizational cultures should be described by participative and collaborative
inquiry rather than diagnosis (Wells, 2010). Seel applied Schein's (2004) approaches to
organizational culture to the argument - if a culture is co-created by the collective
membership of the organization, then these members should jointly inquire into it. In an
effort to identify the specific constructs used by researchers to describe the larger concept
of organizational culture, Detert, Schroeder, and Mauriel (2000) performed a qualitative
content analysis of the literature. The results of the analysis indicated a small number of
constructs were common in the majority of existing culture research. These constructs
included ideas held within organizations about the basis of truth and rationality, the
nature of time and the time horizon, stability relative to change and innovation,
orientation to work, isolation relative to cooperation, and orientation and focus (i.e.,
internal versus external focus). The last construct was of interest from a continuous
improvement perspective. It included ideas about whether the organization assumes it
controls, or is controlled by, its external environment, wherein the focus would be either
on improving processes in the organization or on improving its standing in the industry
(Detert et al., 2000). Culture in groups and organizations has been difficult to define in
unambiguous terms (Schein, 2004). Cameron and Quinn (2006) maintained that the
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broadness and inclusiveness of organizational culture have resulted in the many different
conceptualizations. As noted by Cameron and Quinn, since the concept is comprised of a
set of complex, interrelated, and ambiguous factors, it would be impossible to include
every relevant factor when assessing organizational culture. Reason (1997) observed that
a continuing controversy among social scientists was whether a culture is something an
organization has or whether it is something an organization is. Reason viewed culture as
a hidden force that unified an organization by providing meaning, direction, and
mobilization. Although operationally culture has been defined as shared values, beliefs,
assumptions, and norms, these concepts are seldom documented yet learned by living in
an organization and becoming a part of it (Frick, 2007). Different conceptualizations of
organizational culture may have been developed due to differences in actual
organizational cultures. As stated by Shafritz and Ott (2001) , each organizational culture
is different because what has worked repeatedly for one organization may not for another,
which results in changes to basic assumptions. These researchers maintained that an
organization's culture is shaped by many factors, including the societal culture in which it
resides and its technologies, markets, and competition (Wells, 2010). Further, some
organizations have many subcultures that exist in different geographical areas (Shafritz &
Ott, 2001). Other factors that shape an organization's culture include the structural
foundations of the organization, which may be ordered by the regulatory environment,
and the internal integration necessary for group functioning and adaptation to changing
environments (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Schein (2004) maintained that when the
intangible aspects of culture are applied to organizations engaged in producing goods and
services, the term organizational culture must be broadened to include the tangible
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aspects of structure and patterning (Schein, 2004). Yukl (2002) stated that structure
would be used to stabilize an organization and the organizational structure included
systems, processes, policies, rules, and the way the organization functions. According to
Schein (2004), patterning and integration would be used to bind the various intangible
elements of culture into a coherent whole. Schein viewed patterns as derived from
accumulated learning as an organization solves its problems, while integration was
viewed as derived from various subcultures, such as professional and national
subcultures. Other dimensions have been proposed to classify organizational cultures by
types. Schein presented these other dimensions as universal typologies (Schein, 2004).
According to Schein, the value of typologies was to provide useful categories for sorting
out the complexities of organizational realities. The basic typology focused on
assumptions about individual participation and involvement in the organization. The next
level of typology focused on assumptions of corporate character and culture. A more
difficult typology was described as intraorganizational. Schein (2004) viewed the
intraorganizational typology as difficult because work arrangements within many
organizations were based on a combination of the work to be done and the occupational
reference groups performing the work. Thus, organizational culture includes formal
structural relationships and problem solving approaches and informal assumptions and
group interconnections (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2005). Based on the various
conceptualizations of organizational culture, a formal definition of organizational culture
was developed by Schein (2004) that included the various factors that shape a culture.
This definition of organizational culture has been used in the nuclear power industry to
conceptualize a nuclear safety culture (Wells, 2010). The culture of an organization was
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defined as a pattern of shared assumptions that the organization learned as it solved the
problems encountered with internal integration of its members and external adaptation to
its surroundings. Schein added to this definition that the organization's culture has
worked sufficiently well to be considered valid to be taught to new organizational
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel relative to the problems of
integration and adaptation. Schein distinguished between underlying beliefs and
espoused values, wherein the values mayor may not be consistent with the beliefs
(Schein, 2004). For example, an organization might espouse that quality is the primary
objective for its products, but the underlying belief might be that any defects in the
products would be marketed anyway at a discounted price. The underlying beliefs of the
organization's culture would be the learned responses to problems encountered in the
external environment and problems encountered with internal integration (Wells, 2010).
Another way of conceptualizing organizational culture is as a composite of interacting
subcultures that have specific characteristics and a sense of identification (Wagner &
Hollenbeck, 2005). As noted by Wagner and Hollenbeck, subcultures may be classified
in several ways, including occupational and professional skills and generational and
national diversities. Individuals in the same subcultures would tend to think and act more
similarly than would people from other subcultures. These organizational subcultures
resulted in diverse networks of meaning yet were homogenous with the organization's
overall culture. Cameron and Quinn (2006) identified four major organizational culture
types.
The first major culture type described was the hierarchy culture, characterized by
a formalized and structured workplace, procedures that govern work people perform, and
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effective leadership to organize and coordinate. The long-term concerns of hierarchy
organizations were viewed as stability, predictability, and efficiency, thus requiring
formal rules and policies. The second major culture type - the market culture - evolved
as organizations encountered new competitive challenges. The market culture was
described as a results-oriented organization, orientated to the external environment
instead of internal matters (Wells, 2010). According to Cameron and Quinn, the market
organizational culture does not rely on rules and procedures, and has a set of core values
focused on competitiveness and productivity. The third major culture type was described
as a clan culture, characterized by an emphasis on loyalty and tradition, teamwork,
participation, and consensus. The last major culture type was described as an adhocracy
culture, characterized by a dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative workplace. This type
organization was viewed as committed to experimentation, innovation, and change.
Organizations develop a major culture type dependent on the industry, stage of
organizational life cycle, and leadership style (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Schneider
considered organizational cultures strong when all levels of the organization shared the
same goals and values (Schneider, 1990). In strong organizational cultures, people
throughout the organization at all levels understood what they were supposed to do
because a few guiding principles were clearly established (Reason, 1997). Not all
organizational cultures, however, would be desirable. Organizational researchers have
described a number of negative or dysfunctional cultural dimensions (Hofstede, n.d.;
Reason, 1997; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2005). Dysfunctional dimensions of culture
included paranoid, bureaucratic, and political factors. Another type of dysfunctional
culture was described as anxiety-avoidance. Although dysfunctional and counter cultural
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behaviors and practices have been observed wherein organizational cultures were
disrupted, Mann (2005) observed that counter cultures typically disrupted other
organizational factors as well and the topic was broader in scope than simply culture.
Researchers of organizational cultures have discussed actions necessary for maintaining
the culture and reshaping or changing the culture (Wells, 2010). Some researchers
concluded that organizational cultures were maintained through constancy of business
purpose for improvement, unity of organizational members through participation and
ownership of work, intimacy among organizational members through sharing, and
integrity in work practices (Smith, 2006). Some researchers have considered cultures in
any group setting as dynamic - naturally evolving through various kinds of incremental
changes (Trice & Beyer, 1993). Trice and Beyer stated that attempts to maintain an
organization's culture involved adjustments in ideas, practices, and structures that could
be considered changes, yet concluded that true organizational change referred to
something more deliberate, drastic, and profound than incremental adjustments in the
culture. Trice and Beyer maintained that cultural changes involve a break with the past
and continuity in organizational cultures is disrupted. Three different types of culture
change efforts in organizations were described - revolutionary efforts to change the
cultures of complete organizations, efforts confined to change subunits within
organizations, and efforts that are gradual and incremental with the intent to eventually
change an entire organization's culture (Trice & Beyer, 1993). Other researchers have
considered organizational culture changes as predictable patterns (Cameron & Quinn,
2006). Cameron and Quinn maintained that organizational cultures change as the
organization moves through its life cycle stages. According to this theory, in the earliest
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stages of the organization's life cycle organizations have adhocracy cultures. As the
organization matures and develops, the culture evolves into a clan culture, followed by a
hierarchy culture and finally a market culture. Although this theory of predictability may
be somewhat narrow for high-risk industries such as nuclear power energy, Cameron and
Quinn qualified the theory that culture changes in mature organizations (typically those
classified as hierarchy cultures) have occurred in less predictable patterns. This theory
indicated that culture changes involving hierarchy cultures should be managed
consciously. According to Seel (2000), the purpose of describing an organization's
culture should be because of some need to change the culture or to determine if the
culture needs to be changed. The implications of this viewpoint were that cultural
description did not precede cultural change since organizational members participated in
describing the culture (Wells, 2010). Seel argued that the process of discovery and
inquiry fostered organic change that evolved rather than the classical mandate approach.
Yukl (2002) stated that an organization's culture could be influenced by what leaders
communicate as priorities, values, and concerns and by the ways leaders react to critical
incidents and crises. Organizational leaders also have a role in maintaining and shaping
culture by communicating the desired end-state of results (Yukl, 2002). Schein
maintained that leaders must first understand the organization's culture before attempting
to alter the culture (Schein, 2004). According to Schein, organizational leaders create a
group's culture through primary and secondary embedding mechanisms. Primary
mechanisms included what leaders measure, how leaders react, how resources are
allocated, and how leaders model and coach desired behaviors. Secondary mechanisms
included organizational designs, systems, procedures and rituals. Some theorists have
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argued that the prevailing cultural values would lead organizational members to rely on
specific sources of guidance to make sense of what is happening around them, and that
reliance on particular sources of guidance would influence the individual and the
organization's cultural foundations (Smith, Peterson, & Schwartz, 2002). For instance,
organizational actions for improving competitiveness in response to changing business
environments and customer demands have resulted in changes to organizational cultures
(Smith et al., 2002). Researchers in sociology and psychology have provided other
perspectives on organizational cultures. Bochner (2003) discussed the psychological
processes that occur between individuals and groups who differ in their cultural
backgrounds. The researcher indicated that people working in similar disciplines inhabit
a culturally homogeneous space in that they have comparable values, beliefs, and
technical languages (Wells, 2010). Bochner contended that the interaction of one culture
with another could have potentially adverse reactions. Major change efforts have been
shown to help some organizations adapt to changing environments and improve overall
performance; however, DeFeo and Barnard (2005) observed that most organizational
change initiatives have failed to produce desired results. DeFeo and Barnard maintained
that the fundamental flaw in most change strategies was a focus on the change and the
results rather than developing an understanding of how the organizational culture would
react to the change. Similarly, Kotter (1996) concluded that few organizational change
initiatives have successfully helped organizations improve performance. According to
Kotter, when improvement initiative changes have not produced the desired results, the
interdependence of new practices with existing organizational cultures had not been
factored into change plans and the changes were not anchored in the existing
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organizational culture. Measurement indicators for an organizational culture and changes
within an organizational culture have been difficult to establish because the basic
defining dimensions of an organizational culture are not directly observable (Schein,
2004). This measurement problem may exist because researchers have concluded that a
given organizational culture is defined in the organization's formal structures and
processes, symbolic systems, products or services, and actions of the group membership.
As observed by Itoigawa, Wilpert and Fahlbruch (2005), based on these defining
dimensions, organizational culture cannot be quickly changed at management's desires.
These researchers concurred with Schein (2004) that organizational culture is the endstate of a long process of implementation by all group members in which they define and
construct their system of meanings. Schein stated that empirical measurement of
organizational cultures was difficult because the concept includes shared group rather
than individual values, assumptions, and beliefs (Schein, 2004). It can be concluded that
organizational culture has been conceptualized in various ways because the culture of an
organization has been defined by both mechanistic and organic dimensions and because
every organizational culture is different. Empirical measurement of the concept has been
difficult for researchers because of these competing dimensions. Researchers have
identified that some organizational cultures have been shaped by a distinctive subculture,
such as a professional or industrial subculture, due to the nature of the business.
Furthermore, an organization's culture has been influenced by other factors, including
implementation of processes with the purpose of improving the organization.
Organizational cultures can be changed yet some changes have not been as expected
(Wells, 2010). Although major change efforts have been shown to help some
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organizations adapt to changing environments and improve overall performance, many
organizational change initiatives have failed to produce desired results when the
interdependence of new practices with existing organizational cultures had not been
adequately considered (Wells, 2010).

2.2 Nuclear Safety Culture
Since the creation of nuclear technologies during World War II, nuclear industry
leaders and regulatory bodies has struggled with the question of how safe is safe enough
(Dahlgren, Lederman, Palomo, & Szikszai, 2001). Safety is a common goal for
organizations involved in designing, operating, and regulating nuclear installations, yet
the concept of safety has not been easy to define (Dahlgren et al., 2001). A general
understanding has evolved over time as to what attributes a nuclear power plant should
have in order to operate safely (Wells, 2010). Practitioners and researchers; however,
continue to develop and understand one key attribute - a nuclear safety culture. The
concept of a nuclear safety culture was developed by researchers in the aftermath of a
nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 1988). On April 26, 1986, reactor number four at the Ukrainian
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded, which resulted in the top being torn from the
reactor and exposing the nuclear core (Medvedev, 1990). Further explosions and the
resulting fire sent a plume of highly radioactive fallout into the atmosphere and over an
extensive geographical area. Large geographical areas were badly contaminated, dozens
of people died, and 336,000 people were evacuated and resettled (Medvedev, 1990).
Nuclear industry leaders viewed the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant as a
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reminder of the risks and hazards of nuclear technology (Medvedev, 1990). Further, this
accident showed the importance of maintaining strong cultural attributes related to
nuclear safety (IAEA, 1988; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2004).
According to Medvedev (1990), the accident was caused by poor group relationships
among plant organizations, weak communications, and pressures to continue with a
planned test despite a known flawed design. Kapitza (1993) observed that the safety of
any hazardous enterprise is determined by the human factor, such that human attitudes
and behaviors have to be factored into every stage of the enterprise, from conception and
design to construction and operation. Kapitza maintained that the lack of a nuclear safety
culture mindset was the root cause of the Chernobyl accident
Although the severity of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident may have
been the catalyst for studies of a nuclear safety culture concept, the industry had its first
significant safety culture incident in 1979 as a result of the accident at the Three Mile
Island Nuclear Power Plant in the United States (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations,
2004). As explained by Itoigawa, Wilpert and Fahlbruch (2005), the accident at the
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, resulted
in a partial meltdown of the reactor core. The researchers determined the accident was
caused by a combination of personnel errors, design deficiencies, and component failures.
The extensive literature on these two nuclear accidents, however, has dealt almost
exclusively with technical, radiological, and environmental issues (Wells, 2010).
Researchers for the International Atomic Energy Agency studied the concept of a nuclear
safety culture after the Chernobyl accident and developed common terms, definitions,
and methods for assessment (International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 1988;
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INSAG, 1991). These researchers defined a nuclear safety culture in more holistic terms
that included all factors and groups that influence safety at nuclear power plants. Similar
to Schein's (2004) definition of organizational culture, the initial nuclear industry
definition of nuclear safety culture included the concepts of characteristics and attitudes
of both the organizations and the individuals. Some researchers and practitioners have
argued that a focus on characteristics and attitudes had confined discussions over nuclear
safety culture to the mental-cognitive area of attitudes and noted that attitudes and actions
do not correlate well (Wert, 2003; Wilpert & Itoigawa, 2001). Other researchers, most
notably at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, explored nuclear safety cultures and
the various factors affecting the diverse dimensions of a safety culture in order to
diagnose the current safety culture at nuclear plants and to establish a common reference
framework and common terminology (INPO, 2004). Later conceptualizations of nuclear
safety culture included the behaviors and actions that support a desired nuclear safety
culture (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2009). These researchers used
industry experiences and data developed by others, often based on nuclear power plant
events, to build a body of knowledge that was not previously well defined. As stated by
Wilpert and Itoigawa (2001), some theorists have maintained that a safety culture is the
organizational culture of industries that are high risk in nature. Some researchers have
concluded the concept of nuclear safety culture has not been well defined (Wells, 2010).
For instance, Sorensen (2002) concluded that the mechanism by which safety culture
affects the safety of nuclear power plant operations was not well established (U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], 2002). Sorensen observed that statistical
evidence linking specific attributes of a safety culture with the safety of nuclear power
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plant operations was limited. According to Sorensen, these limitations were caused by
investigators of nuclear power events constructing new frameworks for each event rather
than building on what had been studied previously. Irrespective of the continuing debate
about nuclear safety culture, the original concept as defined by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (1988; 1999) included a set of critical factors and organizational
members that are foundationally important (IAEA, 1988)(International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA], 1999). Critical factors included training, goals, and policies. One
critical factor that has influenced nuclear safety cultures, termed nuclear business
acumen, included the ability to manage the unique interaction among technology,
economics, human factors, and safety in a changing nuclear business environment (Wells,
2010). In a subsequent study, twelve organizational factors were identified as most
important for nuclear safety: external influences, goals and strategies, management
functions and overview, resource allocation, human resource management, training,
coordination of work, organizational knowledge, proceduralization, organizational
culture, organizational learning, and communications (Nuclear Energy Agency [NEA],
1999). Each of these factors was considered to be interrelated, wherein one could
influence another. Researchers at the International Atomic Energy Agency stated the
organizational membership included several levels, specifically the level of management,
the level of individuals, and the extra-organizational level of suppliers and government
agencies (IAEA, 1999). Similar to Schein's (2004) definition of organizational culture,
membership in a nuclear safety culture was viewed as comprehensive so that a pattern of
shared basic assumptions of external adaptation and internal integration could work
synergistically to solve common problems, with nuclear safety the overriding priority.
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As noted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear safety is achieved when
every member of the group is dedicated to the common goal (INSAG, 1991). In
subsequent studies, researchers have identified that a safety culture can be strengthened
over time (IAEA, 1998; International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2002).
Analysts at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations studied nuclear power plant
events and problems relating to shortfalls in a nuclear safety culture (Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations [INPO], 2003; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2004).
Perin (2005) argued that a nuclear power plant culture embodies several different cultures
of control based on different methods of risk assessment. For example, the commercial
nuclear industry culture is organized around a structured logic of command and control
which requires tradeoffs with a parallel logic of problem identification and diagnosis
(Wells, 2010). The two different intra-cultural logics have not aligned in an environment
of intense pressures relative to schedule, electricity output, and reduction of operating
costs. Dimensions of a nuclear safety culture may be defined by multiple attributes and
measured through multiple methods (Corcoran, 2010; International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA], 2002). Researchers have typically employed questionnaires and surveys
to measure the attributes of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and
behaviors; and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making, all of which have
some relevance to worker performance and the safety culture (Corcoran, 2010; Findley,
2004; Itoigawa et al., 2005; Reiman, 2007). Other researchers have studied safety culture
attitudes, values, and beliefs in other high-risk industries (Bums, 2005; Helrnreich &
Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 2006; Reason, 1997). A nuclear safety culture may also be
defined by specific observable physical attributes (Corcoran, 2010; Institute of Nuclear
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Power Operations, 2009). Observations of human actions and physical objects, such as
the quality of physical goods and archival records, have been employed in some
continuous improvement and safety culture studies (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Keating,
Olivia, Repenning, Rockart, & Sterman, 1999). Human observations have frequently
been used in nuclear power plant studies because the situation and resultant behaviors are
not easily predictable (Corcoran, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2006).
Nuclear safety culture researchers have focused on the individual worker's commitment
and performance based on attitudes, work approaches, and communication systems
(Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Reiman, 2007). Reason and Hobbs (2003) concluded that the
most common worker errors at nuclear power plants were caused by failure to do
something that should have been done rather than doing something incorrectly. Some
nuclear safety culture researchers have studied other dimensions of the complex and
dynamic interrelationships within the organizational cultures at nuclear power plants.
Findley (2004) and Matthews (2006) found that organizational priorities were not always
properly balanced between safety and production and often safety cultures were
constrained when production factors became priorities over prevention factors. Reiman
(2007) studied the maintenance organizations at three European nuclear power plants and
concluded that nuclear safety was affected if the demands of the organizational task were
not aligned with the dynamics of the organization's culture. Researchers have stated
common parallel underlying extended shutdowns of U.S. nuclear power plants appeared
to be the tension between increasing economic and production pressures and diminishing
safety culture margins (Institute of Nuc1ear Power Operations, 2003; Itoigawa et al.,
2005). For example, in 1996 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission directed
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Northeast Utilities to shut down the three nuclear reactors at the Millstone Nuclear Power
Plant in Connecticut. Contributing to the shutdown was diminishing safety culture
margins exacerbated by competitive advantage strategies (McAvoy & Rosenthal, 2005).
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission directed closure of the Maine Yankee Nuclear
Power Plant in 1997 because of cost cutting measures at the expense of safety
considerations (Jackson, 1997). A significant operating event occurred in 2002 at the
Davis - Besse Nuclear Power Plant when the reactor pressure vessel head began to leak
radioactive coolant (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2002). Analysts at the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations concluded a major contributor to this event was a
shift in focus at all organizational levels from implementing high safety standards to
justifying minimal safety standards. These analysts stated that a reduction in standards
resulted from excessive focus on meeting short-term production goals. Within the highrisk industries of aviation and space operations, medical surgery, chemical processing,
and offshore drilling, more safety culture studies have been conducted than in the nuclear
industry (Wells, 2010). Researchers have traced various efficiency and cost containment
influences as sources of accidents (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003;
Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 2006; Vaughan, 1996). Based on the accidents
studied, a parallel was evident among increasing production pressures and schedule
conflicts and diminishing safety culture margins. Corcoran (2010) stated that the concept
of a nuclear safety culture could benefit from more research and reflection. There has
been limited research on the dimensions of a nuclear safety culture when confronted by
opposing economic forces. This research was conducted to bridge a gap in knowledge
and to supplement the body of knowledge on nuclear safety cultures.
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In summary, nuclear safety culture is to an organization what personality is to an
individual: an intangible facet that can be seen only through behaviors and espoused
values. It is under constant change; it represents the collective behaviors of the
organization, which adapt over time as the organization and its members change and
apply themselves to their daily activities. As problems are encountered, the organization
learns. Successes and failures become ingrained into the organization’s nuclear safety
culture and form the basis for the means by which the organization does business. These
behaviors are taught to new members of the organization as the correct way to perceive,
think, act and feel. Nuclear safety is a collective responsibility. No one in the
organization is exempt from the obligation to ensure nuclear safety first.
Where organizational culture is the way that people in an organization do things;
nuclear safety culture is the way that people in an organization do things with nuclear
safety as the overarching priority. Lastly, nuclear safety culture is dependent upon
having the necessary framework of an organizational culture that embraces it as the top
priority (Wells, 2010).

2.3 Current Trends in Nuclear Safety Culture Performance Measurement
Performance measurement can be defined as: the process of quantifying the
efficiency and effectiveness of action; a metric used to quantify the efficiency and/or
effectiveness of action or the set of metrics used to quantify both the efficiency and
effectiveness of actions (Neely, Mills, Gregory, & Platts, 1995). Operationally,
performance measurement refers to the use of a multi-dimensional set of performance
measures for the planning and management of a business. This set of measures is multi-
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dimensional as it includes both financial and non-financial measures, it includes both
internal and external measures of performance and it often includes both measures that
quantify what has been achieved as well as measures that are used to help predict the
future. Furthermore, performance measurement cannot be done in isolation.
Performance measurement is only relevant within a reference framework against which
the efficiency and effectiveness of action can be judged (Neely, 1998).
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) model for assessing and addressing nuclear
safety culture issues places primary responsibility on line management, and in particular,
on the site leadership team. The purpose is to provide an objective, transparent and
safety-focused process, which uses all of the information available (e.g., corrective action
program, performance trends, NRC inspections, industry evaluations, nuclear safety
culture assessments, self-assessments, audits, operating experience, employee concerns
program, and workforce issues) to provide an early indication of potential problems,
develop effective corrective actions and monitor the effectiveness of the actions (Nuclear
Energy Institute [NEI], 2010). It utilizes the following critical organizational systems
that are critical in supporting increased levels of safety and provides guidance for
necessary actions to ensure the health of the nuclear safety culture.
While it is not possible to directly measure culture, and thus there must be some
subjectivity, there are tangible aspects of plant conditions, which can be trended to
determine if nuclear safety cultural issues contributed to the condition. In addition,
process weaknesses, discovered through audits, self-assessments, or inspections, also can
provide symptoms of nuclear safety cultural problems. Similarly, the intangible aspects
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of attitudes and behaviors of site personnel can be assessed through surveys, interviews
and the behavioral observations program, etc. (NEI, 2010).
The INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture describes the essential
attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
[INPO], 2004). The INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture describes the
essential traits of a healthy nuclear safety culture (INPO, 2012a; Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations [INPO], 2012b). Together they provide a useful framework (i.e.,
criteria) for assessing and categorizing the data, and in combination, are used to identify
potential nuclear safety cultural issues for action. Using a consistent model and
terminology throughout the entire process allows clear communication of issues with
which the entire site can understand and respond (NEI, 2010).

Figure 6. Site Nuclear Safety Culture Process
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The following are the key inputs (i.e., the process inputs), accessing both the
tangible and intangible; to the NEI nuclear safety culture process as illustrated by Figure
6 (NEI, 2010):

NRC Inspection Results
These include the baseline inspections of plant and processes (especially the
problem identification and resolution inspection which also looks at safety conscious
work environment and any past nuclear safety culture assessments), supplemental
inspections, and event follow-up. If an inspection finding identifies that a nuclear safety
culture issue may have caused the deficiency, the station in assessing its nuclear safety
culture can use these data. Recurring issues receive careful review to determine if other
process inputs are signaling problems in the same area (NEI, 2010).
Nuclear Safety Culture Self-Assessments
INPO SOER 02-4 Recommendation 2 states: Conduct a self-assessment to
determine to what degree your organization has a healthy respect for nuclear safety and
that nuclear safety is not compromised by production priorities. The self-assessment
emphasizes the leadership skills and approaches necessary to achieve and maintain the
proper focus on nuclear safety. INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and
INPO Traits of a Health Nuclear Safety Culture are the basis for this self-assessment
(NEI, 2010).
Industry Evaluations
Evaluations conducted by outside organizations can provide valuable insights.
For example, INPO evaluations are conducted approximately every other year, ideally in
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the alternate year from the nuclear safety culture assessment. Included in the INPO
evaluation is an assessment of nuclear safety culture, resulting in a nuclear safety culture
assessment of a site almost every year (NEI, 2010).

Operating Experience (OE)
Information from other sites is available from INPO and NRC to improve
performance. Any operating experience (OPEX) items tagged as safety culture-related
by INPO or NRC are assessed for relevance to the station (NEI, 2010).
QA/Self-Assessment/Benchmarking/Behavioral Observations
Each site performs a variety of self-reviews. These include audits required in the
quality assurance programs, department self-assessments, and benchmarking of other
sites in the industry (or other industries). It also includes behavioral observations by
managers and supervisors in the field (NEI, 2010).
Employee Concerns Program (ECP)
This program provides opportunities to raise issues outside the normal chain of
command. ECP issues typically are not entered into the CAP, but ECP trends are
considered by the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NEI, 2010).
Workforce Issues
These include data sources that could reflect concerns within the workforce that
may be precursors to nuclear safety culture or safety conscious work environment
(SCWE) issues, such as: grievance trends, potential SCWE claims, hostile work
environment claims, sexual harassment or peer on peer harassment, industrial safety
trends, disciplinary action review board trends, changes in compensation/incentive
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programs, change management issues and workforce management issues (e.g., staffing,
knowledge transfer, or certification issues) (NEI, 2010).

Corrective Action Program (CAP) Evaluations
In addition to being the program that is used to identify, analyze and resolve issues, the
CAP is used to identify and evaluate trends across the entire data set of the CAP, for
example, by using key words. The data from root cause and apparent cause evaluations
also provide insights into potential nuclear safety culture issues and trends. The CAP is
the largest single source of potential input to the culture monitoring process. Because the
CAP is so comprehensive and encompassing at most sites, it is incumbent on the site to
select the subset of CAP evaluations that will be fed into the culture monitoring process.
(NEI, 2010).
Site Performance Trends
Each site has a broad suite of indicators to assess performance. These indicators
go beyond the NRC performance indicators and assess intermediate outcomes, which, if
not corrected, could lead to safety system failures, scrams or events. Trends can be
developed in these indicators and the cause of the trend – process or design deficiencies,
training, resources, or nuclear safety culture issues – can be examined and corrective
action taken. Examples include operator workarounds, control room deficiencies,
preventive maintenance deferred, and open positions (NEI, 2010).
The Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP) monitors the process
inputs, which are indicative of the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture; to
identify strengths and potential concerns that merit additional attention by the
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organization. The SCMP: collects process inputs for a defined time period; categorizes
process inputs; bins the inputs to safety culture attributes; sorts data by principle and
performs collegial challenge of aggregated data; looks for long term trends; provides
ratings and recommended actions; and reviews status and effectiveness of prior safety
culture-related actions.
The Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT) is comprised of the senior-most
management personnel onsite charged with the safe operation of a nuclear plant. To
promote and monitor the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture, the SCRT
periodically (i.e., at least semi-annually) assesses the station against the INPO Principles
for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture. This self-critique is intended to be reflective and
performed by the SCRT itself in a group setting. During this review, the SCRT examines
a variety of information that reflects the health of the organization’s work environment to
discern trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges. The reports of
the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel and previous nuclear safety culture
assessments, INPO evaluation nuclear safety culture findings, and any insights from the
offsite nuclear safety review board (or equivalent) are reviewed by the SCRT prior to the
meeting. Although a variety of inputs may be considered during the self-critique, the
most valuable insight often comes from the frank discussion of nuclear safety culture
based on the SCRT’s observations and insights. As the organization’s senior leaders, the
SCRT possesses broad, diverse backgrounds in managing nuclear power plants and the
nuclear professionals that make up the workforce. The SCRT is often able to discern
subtle trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges from personal
interactions, in-field observations, and other means. The end result is an improved
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understanding among the members of the SCRT of where their efforts to further improve
the station’s nuclear safety culture need to be applied.
The SCRT’s Nuclear Safety Culture Review is documented using the INPO
Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear
Safety Culture to identify strengths, areas found acceptable, and areas in need of
improvement. Follow-up actions are tracked. Strengths and improvement opportunities
that are identified are communicated back to the organization to drive desired behaviors
and actions for fostering a strong nuclear safety culture. The following (Table 1)
provides examples of triggers for action by the SCRT.
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Table 1. Recommended Actions

Improvement Opportunity/Weakness
NSCA weaknesses or negative observations
Trends noted in NSCMP and SCRT that do not constitute a
significant concern but need to be addressed

Recommended
Action
Enter into CAP
Directed training,
communication,
etc.
ACE or CCE

A significant immediate indication of declining safety culture
performance in a department (e.g., issue with supervisors in the
department)
A significant immediate indication of declining safety culture
ACE, CCE, RCE,
performance at the station (e.g., issue with a department manager or NSCA
or senior manager)
An indication of a decline in safety culture over the last two
ACE, CCE or RCE
quarters in a functional area (e.g., multiple workforce issues,
emotional issues documented in CAP, etc.)
An indication of a declining trend over the last four quarters at
RCE or NSCA
the station (e.g., increase in allegations over historic averages,
multiple Office of Investigation concerns in an area)
A noticeable difference in a functional area from the remainder of ACE or RCE
the station culture (e.g., increase in CAP entries that are
emotional, survey results indicate a measureable difference from
the station norm, etc.)
Indications of a return of a previously addressed issue indicating ACE or RCE
corrective actions were not durable (e.g., return of similar issues
to issues addressed two or more years ago and believed
corrected)
A continuing decline in the culture of a functional area or the
RCE or NSCA
station indicating corrective actions are ineffective (e.g.,
repetitive issues after corrective actions have been completed)
Request from NRC senior management due to their concern over Independent or
performance (e.g., longstanding plant performance in column
third party NSCA
three of the action matrix or performance in column four)
Recommendation from external safety board to conduct
Independent or
independent or third party assessment
third party NSCA
ACE = Apparent Cause Evaluation; CCE = Common Cause Evaluation; RCE = Root
Cause Evaluation; NSCA = Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment

Few studies of economic effects on a nuclear safety culture could be found in the
literature. This despite the documented results of economic pressures and challenged on
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nuclear power plants. Researchers and analysts have documented regulatory business
decisions that indicate economic considerations have contributed to changing
conceptualizations of a NSC.
The NRC made official the following Nuclear Safety Culture Statement of Policy
by publishing it in the Federal Register on June 14, 2011.
The purpose of this Statement of Policy is to set forth the Commission’s
expectation that individuals and organizations establish and maintain a positive
safety culture commensurate with the safety and security significance of their
activities and the nature and complexity of their organizations and functions. This
includes all licensees, certificate holders, permit holders, authorization holders,
holders of quality assurance program approvals, vendors and suppliers of safetyrelated components, and applicants for a license, certificate, permit, authorization,
or quality assurance program approval, subject to NRC authority. The
Commission encourages the Agreement States, Agreement State licensees and
other organizations interested in nuclear safety to support the development and
maintenance of a positive safety culture, as articulated in this Statement of Policy.
Nuclear Safety Culture is defined as the core values and behaviors resulting from
a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over
competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment. Individuals
and organizations performing regulated activities bear the primary responsibility
for safety and security. The performance of individuals and organizations can be
monitored and trended and, therefore, may be used to determine compliance with
requirements and commitments and may serve as an indicator of possible problem
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areas in an organization’s safety culture. The NRC will not monitor or trend
values. These will be the organization’s responsibility as part of its safety culture
program. Organizations should ensure that personnel in the safety and security
sectors have an appreciation for the importance of each, emphasizing the need for
integration and balance to achieve both safety and security in their activities.
Safety and security activities are closely intertwined. While many safety and
security activities complement each other, there may be instances in which safety
and security interests create competing goals. It is important that consideration of
these activities be integrated so as not to diminish or adversely affect either; thus,
mechanisms should be established to identify and resolve these differences. A
safety culture that accomplishes this would include all nuclear safety and security
issues associated with NRC - regulated activities. Experience has shown that
certain personal and organizational traits are present in a positive safety culture.
A trait, in this case, is a pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving that emphasizes
safety, particularly in goal conflict situations, e.g., production, schedule, and the
cost of the effort versus safety. It should be noted that although the term
‘‘security’’ is not expressly included in the following traits, safety and security
are the primary pillars of the NRC’s regulatory mission. Consequently,
consideration of both safety and security issues, commensurate with their
significance, is an underlying principle of this Statement of Policy. The following
are traits of a positive safety culture: (1) Leadership Safety Values and Actions—
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors; (2)
Problem Identification and Resolution - Issues potentially impacting safety are
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promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected
commensurate with their significance; (3) Personal Accountability - All
individuals take personal responsibility for safety; (4) Work Processes -The
process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety
is maintained; (5) Continuous Learning - Opportunities to learn about ways to
ensure safety are sought out and implemented; (6) Environment for Raising
Concerns - A safety conscious work environment is maintained where personnel
feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation,
harassment, or discrimination; (7) Effective Safety Communication Communications maintain a focus on safety; (8) Respectful Work Environment Trust and respect permeate the organization; and (9) Questioning Attitude Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions
and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or
inappropriate action. There may be traits not included in this Statement of Policy
that are also important in a positive safety culture. It should be noted that these
traits were not developed to be used for inspection purposes. It is the
Commission’s expectation that all individuals and organizations, performing or
overseeing regulated activities involving nuclear materials, should take the
necessary steps to promote a positive safety culture by fostering these traits as
they apply to their organizational environments. The Commission recognizes the
diversity of these organizations and acknowledges that some organizations have
already spent significant time and resources in the development of a positive
safety culture. The Commission will take this into consideration as the regulated
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community addresses the Statement of Policy. (NRC-2010-0282, Final Safety
Culture Policy Statement, 2011)

While it is not possible to directly measure culture, without subjectivity, the NRC
(Figure 7) and INPO (Figure 8) have adopted the same empiricist trait based framework
for measuring the health of a nuclear safety culture. That is, there are tangible aspects of
plant conditions that can be trended to determine if nuclear safety cultural issues
contributed to the condition. In addition, process weaknesses, discovered through audits,
self-assessments, or inspections, also can provide symptoms of nuclear safety cultural
problems. Similarly, the intangible aspects of attitudes and behaviors of site personnel
can be assessed through surveys, interviews and the behavioral observations program,
etc. (NEI, 2010)
The performance of individuals and organizations can be monitored and trended
and, therefore, may serve as an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety culture.
However, the health of a facility’s safety culture could lie anywhere along a broad
continuum, depending on the degree to which the attributes of safety culture are
embraced. Even though safety culture is somewhat of an intangible concept, it is possible
to determine whether a station tends toward one end of the continuum or the other.
Furthermore, if we could measure nuclear safety culture directly then likely we
would have validated theories to state how to exactly create and sustain a healthy nuclear
safety culture. However, since we are "looking through a dark mirror" at the reflection of
the nuclear safety culture we must be careful to ensure that we are looking at the
appropriate secondary indicators, looking at them frequent enough, and with the right
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metric to understand what they are trying to communicate to us. Hence the evolution
from behaviors indicative of a healthy nuclear safety culture to traits as we continue to
master the elusive formula that will consistently yield the desired results. If we fail to
realize that we are inferring the health of a nuclear safety culture by looking at its outputs
then we are already on the road to another black swan nuclear event.
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Figure 7. NRC Traits of a Positive Nuclear Safety Culture
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Figure 8. INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture
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2.4 Other High-Risk Industry Safety Cultures
As defined by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (2009),
industrial safety cultures included shared beliefs, practices, and attitudes that existed at a
business. An organization's safety culture was viewed as the end result of a number of
factors, including management and employee norms, assumptions and beliefs, and
attitudes; policies and procedures; actions and lack of actions to correct unsafe behaviors;
employee training, involvement, and motivation; and production and efficiency factors.
According to the U. S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (2009), peer
coaching at all levels and employee awareness of changing conditions and situations at
job locations were observed at organizations with strong occupational safety cultures
(Wells, 2010).
Researchers in the field of general occupational safety have maintained that safety
accidents are typically caused by failure of attitudes, failure of technical training, failure
of safety training, or combinations of any of these three causes (Bums, 2005; Roughton
and Crutchfield, 2008; Williams, 2002). Bums (2005) stated that the primary focus of
industrial safety programs should be on changing employee behaviors and attitudes.
Bums maintained that although many researchers have argued that trust was important in
modeling safety cultures, attitudes about trust, whether implicit or explicit, were equally
important. Roughton and Crutchfield (2008) maintained that fundamental principles for
preventing industrial safety accidents included establishing a positive culture where
individuals understood job hazards and were not punished for reporting accidents and
near misses. According to Roughton and Crutchfield, a positive safety culture included
rewarding safe workers, sharing information about accidents and near misses, and
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assessing the potential hazards of a job while planning the work. Williams (2002) stated
that a positive safety culture should start with management behaviors.
Hansen (2006) stated that a strong organizational safety strategy included
meaningful measurement, employee participation, shared values, positive recognition,
process improvement, continuous improvement, and alignment. According to Hansen,
since the work processes contributed to most occupational accidents the safety goals
should be challenging yet causing incrementally improving processes. Further, Hansen
maintained that safety values should be on the same level as production values and
aligned with all organizational members.
Within the complex, high-risk industries of aviation and space operations, medical
surgery, chemical processing, and offshore drilling, more safety culture studies have been
conducted than in the nuclear industry. Most contemporary researchers have studied the
attributes of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors;
and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making, all of which have some
relevance to safety cultures (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003; Helmreich &
Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 2006; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Roughton &
Crutchfield, 2008; Vaughan, 1996). Various efficiency and cost containment influences
have been traced as sources of accidents. Based on the accidents studied, a parallel was
evident among increasing economic and production pressures and schedule conflicts and
diminishing safety culture margins (Wells, 2010).
Mearns et al. (2003) stated there is little evidence to link weaknesses in safety at
the organizational level with individual accidents; however, the researchers noted case
studies of major disasters have linked weaknesses in safety culture with organizational
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accidents. Reason (1997) maintained that work-related values, behaviors, and degrees of
beliefs at industrial plants are universal, but are influenced in varying degrees by
corporate and organizational cultures. Helmreich and Merritt (1998) compared and
contrasted the high - risk industries of aviation and emergency medical operations in the
context of organizational, professional, and national cultures. Survey results of
physicians and nurses in anesthesia, surgery, and intensive care units were compared with
equivalent cockpit crewmembers in commercial aviation. The researchers observed that
some organizational events and incidents occurred when organizational focus noticeably
shifted from implementing high standards to meeting short-term goals. As implied by
Helmreich and Merritt (1998) these short-term goals were often based on resource or
economic conditions and were evident in organizational cultures irrespective of the
influences by national or professional cultures (Wells, 2010).
The January 26, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was an organizational
accident caused by production influences. Vaughan (1996) concluded that over time
production pressures became institutionalized at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). It was theorized that a work group culture had evolved wherein
technical deviations were normalized when the work groups encountered consistent
contributing factors of economic and scheduling pressures.
The February 1, 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia disaster was an organizational
accident with similar preconditions to the Challenger disaster. NASA management had
to devise a new business approach when the United States government reduced the
national space budget by 40% during the period of 1992 to 2000 (Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, 2003). While the intent of the new approach was to improve
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efficiency and effectiveness, the result was a decrease in resources. Under funding
pressure, NASA management began outsourcing much of its work to contractors and
simultaneously began reducing the scope of its operational, or institutional, safety
program (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003). It was assumed that NASA's
ownership of operational safety could be reduced because the contractors would assume
the responsibility for safety. Investigators at the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
concluded that organizational streamlining and downsizing conveyed an additional
message to workers that efficiency was an important goal. Combined with the reductions
that decreased the safety focus, efficiency was viewed by employees as more important
than safety (Wells, 2010).
Reason (1997) studied safety accidents in aviation, petrochemical, offshore oil,
and transportation industries. Reason concluded that significant accidents in some highrisk industries could be repeated in other high-risk industries because of flaws in causal
analyses that led to a misguided focus on technical failures rather than organizational
weaknesses as learning organizations. Thus, some safety critical organizations had not
been effectively solving underlying safety culture problems and, in turn, were not
effectively learning from accidents and incidents whether small or large in magnitude.
Based on the accidents studied, a parallel was evident between increasing economic and
production pressures and diminishing safety culture margins.
According to Reason (1997), the components of a safety culture included an
informed culture, a reporting culture, a just culture, a learning culture, and a flexible
culture. An informed culture was described as leadership-based, in that those responsible
for managing the organizational system had current knowledge about the human,
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technical, organizational, and environmental factors that determined the safety of the
organization as a whole. Reason (1997) maintained that leaders must understand and
acknowledge that people were usually not the instigators of accidents or incidents and
that they usually inherited bad situations that had been developing over a long period. A
reporting culture was described as a climate in which workers were prepared to report
their errors and near misses. Reason viewed a just culture as a way of thinking that
promoted a questioning attitude, was resistant to complacency, was committed to
excellence, and included accountability at all levels of the organization. A learning
culture was described as a willingness to draw the right conclusions from its safety
information system and to implement major reforms. Reason viewed the last component
as a culture where the organization was able to reconfigure itself during times of
environmental changes or attacks (Wells, 2010).
Mearns et al. (2003) concluded from studies of offshore oil and gas operations
that safety cultures were affected by the convergence of several hazardous factors,
including the potential for fire, explosion, and other accidents, work stress, priorities of
continuing operations, and the isolation of installations. In the first year of the research,
production and schedule pressures were not considered significant contributors to a
negative safety culture. In the second year of the research, the researchers found that
continued production and schedule pressures had caused these factors to become
significant contributors to a negative safety culture.
McDonald (2006) summarized the results from a series of studies concerning
aircraft workers. This researcher observed that technicians routinely did not follow
procedures, rationalizing their actions by stating they had developed faster, better, and
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safer ways of performing the tasks than those described in approved procedures. For
many of the aircraft companies studied, professional cultures were found to be
inconsistent with organizational cultures, leading to inconsistencies between established
requirements and the need for flexibility to meet the changing production schedules of
the operational environment (McDonald, 2006).
Within the complex, high-risk industries of aviation and space operations, medical
surgery, chemical processing, and offshore drilling, contemporary researchers have
studied the attributes of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and
behaviors; and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making, all of which have
some relevance to safety cultures. Researchers have documented that a strong
organizational safety strategy should include meaningful measurement, shared values,
continuous improvement, and alignment. Although researchers have traced various
efficiency and cost containment influences as causes of accidents, none have studied the
influence of a continuous improvement process on the respective safety culture. Based
on the accidents studied, a parallel was evident among increasing economic and
production pressures and schedule conflicts and diminishing safety culture margins
(Wells, 2010).

2.5 Summary
From the literature, it can be concluded that an organizational culture has been
conceptualized in various ways because both mechanistic and organic dimensions have
defined the culture of an organization and because every organizational culture is
different (Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Empirical measurement of the concept has been
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difficult for researchers because of these competing dimensions. Researchers have
identified that some organizational cultures have been shaped by influencing factors,
including implementation processes with the purpose of improving the organization
(Cameron & Quinn, 2006; Schein, 2004). Researchers have identified differing
perspectives and frameworks for changing staffing and budget levels to increase return on
investment (ROI); however, there has been no common formula (Shafritz & Ott, 2001).
A NSC has been conceptualized in the literature as either a subset of the
organizational culture or a unique subculture that resides along with the organizational
culture (Wilpert & Itoigawa, 2001). The NSC term is complex and consequently
somewhat difficult to understand. Furthermore, the literature on safety culture has
demonstrated that the concept includes many interrelated components and members of
many organizations (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1999).
It might be expected, due to the interrelationship of economic forces on the
operation of a nuclear power plant, that the introduction of a process to improve a plant’s
ability to create value and contain operating costs would be included in studies of
relationships of economic issues to nuclear safety. Despite the significance of reliable
production priorities with a focus on cost containment, there has been relatively little
research on the various dimensions of a nuclear safety culture when affected by opposing
of leadership and organizational behaviors (Wells, 2010).
The literature has examined organizational causes for nuclear power plant events
and extended plant shutdowns. In recent years researchers have conducted studies
examining precursors to these organizational causes (Itoigawa, 2005). These precursors
have typically including various dimensions of leadership and organizational behaviors.
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Several event investigations at U.S. nuclear power plants have uncovered organizational
flaws (INPO, 2004).
Since the late 1990s, four U.S. nuclear plants have experienced extended
shutdowns because of nuclear safety issues (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations,
2004). A major contributor to some extended plant shutdowns was a shift in focus from
implementing high safety standards to justifying minimal safety standards, resulting from
an excessive focus on meeting short-term production goals (Wells, 2010).
Within other complex, high-risk industries researchers have studied the attributes
of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors; and, degrees
of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making (Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
2003; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 1999).
Provided within the next chapter of this dissertation are the methods and
procedures used to address the research questions. Included in the next chapter are the
rationales for the research design and instrumentation used, methods of data analyses, and
limitations/delimitations of the research. A discussion of ethical assurances is also
included in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Methods and Design
Research methods supporting safety are typically governed by research paradigms
that fall into one of two categories, described as either quantitative or qualitative methods
by authors of research design such as Creswell (2005) and Leedy (2013). However, the
approach to this study does not exclusively follow either of these traditional methods.
According to Leedy (2013), if the research does not fall exclusively into one of the two
defined categories of research, it must be a mixed method approach that draws from each
of the available methods such that “all aspects substantially contribute to a single, greater
whole” (Leedy, 2013, p. 258).
Since this research is not simply a combination of qualitative and quantitative
methods; a deeper understanding of the methods applied, the canons associated with
those methods, and justification of their use is necessary to build a foundation from
which the research can be discussed, critiqued and defended. To that end, the research
methods will be described by investigating three divisions of research: the ontological
philosophy, the epistemological approach and the mode of reasoning.
Each division of research includes a spectrum along which the research falls, with
each end of the respective spectrum labeled to describe its nature. The modes of
reasoning fall into either inductive or deductive categories, ontology is described as either
positivist or constructivist, and the epistemological position is characterized as either
empiricist or rationalist (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012). These divisions of
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research may be illustrated in the form of a cube, an example of which is shown
illustrated in Figure 9. Note that classic quantitative methods as defined by both
Creswell (2005) and Leedy (2013) fall into the lower, left, front portion of the cube,
depicted in red, while qualitative methods appear in the upper, right, front portion,
depicted in green. In addition to providing an overview of these divisions as a framework
for discussion and defense of the selected methods, it also allows deeper insight into the
results of this research and perhaps more importantly, the limitations of its conclusions.

Positivist

Qualitative
Methods

Inductive

Deductive

Constructivist

Quantitative
Methods

Rationalist

Empiricist
Figure 9. Research Methods Cube with Creswell’s (2013) Traditional Methods

This study employs an inductive mode of reasoning. The process of inductive
research involves analysis of data, and subsequent abstraction of a methodology for NSC
Health Performance measurement through identification of patterns or other features that
suggest explanations for its variance. That is, during an inductive research process,
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knowledge (i.e., ideas) is gained through the researcher’s ability to derive meanings out
of the information (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012). This method when juxtaposed
with deductive methods that begin with some form of hypothesis and use confirmatory
methods to either accept or reject a hypothesis based on results of experimentation.
Again, inductive reasoning goes from data to idea where deductive reasoning goes from
idea to data (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012).
In this study, the analyzed data involves thousands of hours of operation of a
commercial nuclear power station recorded in data sets. From this large combined data
set, consisting of many different operational transients and various leadership decisions
trends emerge with regard to health performance of a NSC and these trends can be
expressed quantitatively using MCDA methods. Through observation of these data, a
generalized methodology may be developed to dynamically measure the health
performance of a similar NSC and a model can be developed to express the theory as well
as provide a platform from which to extract these measurements.
Another division of research methods is made with regard to its ontological
position. Ontology refers to the nature of reality, and there are two possible positions.
While Leedy (2013) confines the mind-dependent nature of the constructivists to
qualitative methods, he eloquently describes the division in his introduction to qualitative
research. He begins by describing the positivist position in which the researcher aims for
objectivity, avoiding any influence of the researcher due to impressions or bias. Thus,
the positivist in a general sense is represented by a philosophy in which research
describes the elements of the real world without need of interpretation – it is mind
independent. Results of a positivist approach would be expected to yield objective
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conclusions, and those should not be significantly different among different researchers
who study the topic. The opposing view is a constructivist approach in which the
research is formulated through mind-dependent processes, relying on subjective
evaluation of reality by participants or the judgment of experts in the field. To quote
Leedy (2013), “the [constructivist] researcher is an instrument in much the same way an
oscilloscope, sociogram, or rating scale is an instrument” (p. 139). The research
proposed for this dissertation is heavily weighted toward a constructivist position in that
the process developed through this research is largely based on the interpretation of the
data described above. Finally, since the concept of acceptable NSC health is inherently
dependent upon human judgment, implying there must be some level of mind-dependent
influence, this paper relies primarily on well-established quantitative expressions for
acceptable NSC healthy defined by both the NRC and INPO. Once defined, the
separation functions developed herein treat NSC health as a dependent variable without
further interpretation. Indeed, the value of NSC health modeling lies largely within the
expected standardization of the process and uniform application by clients, necessitating
a positivist methodology that may be replicated not only by other researchers, but also by
practitioners in similar fields.
Finally, research is also influenced by its epistemological approach, a concept that
refers to the method by which human beings develop understanding of reality. Once
again, the possibilities are divided to describe two ends of a spectrum with one end being
referred to as empiricist and the other rationalist in nature. Empiricism suggests that
research is accomplished through observation, while rationalism seeks knowledge
through reasoning. While a substantial data set has been accumulated and studied in
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preparation for this research the approach to developing a working NSC health model is
largely empiricist in its nature. The observation of nuclear power plants, all of which are
equipped with Corrective Action Systems (CAS), allows insight into their respective
NSC.
In summary, the research process described in the next section will be
accomplished through application of an overall qualitative approach that has been
described as a synthetic method and is positioned in the research cube as illustrated in
Figure 10 (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012).

Positivist

Constructivist

Inductive
Rationalist
Deductive
Empiricist
Figure 10. Research Method for Development of Separation Functions

This method is executed by applying an inductive mode of reasoning (i.e., usage
of synthesis reasoning to obtain ideas or knowledge) in combination with empiricist (i.e.,
justification of knowledge through observations) and positivist (i.e., reality is constructed
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through the mind of the observer) research philosophies (Figure 11) (Siangchokyoo &
Sousa-Poza, 2012). The result is the development of a methodology, expressed as a
MCDA model that allows management to evaluate NSC health and to make decisions
with regard to system capacity necessary to meet demand while maintaining the highest
level of NSC health (Bell, 2014).

Epistemological Position
Empiricist:
• Justification of knowledge
through observations and the
sense of experience

Ontological Position
Constructivist:
• Reality is constructed through
the mind of the observer
• Relies on the credibility of the
results
• Results considered true should
others also accept the claim to
be credible in exemplifying
reality

Mode of Reasoning
Inductive:
• Usage of synthesis reasoning
to obtain ideas or knowledge
• From data to idea

Figure 11. Qualitative Methodology Research Paradigm

3.2 Participants
A survey was administered to members of the Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC)
Monitoring Team and Panel at Surry Power Station (SPS) in order to obtain degrees of
belief information with respect to NSC Health Performance. Surry Power Station nuclear
power plant was selected because the plant leadership had a desire to improve their
methodology for NSC health performance assessment. Access to the populations and the
plants' corrective action systems were obtained through the plant's leadership team. The
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researcher had made previous inquiries with the subject nuclear power plant and
experienced no difficulties in gaining access to study the plant's systems.
Human subjects were not directly involved in data collection or analysis. Source
documentation within the corrective action systems at the plant was analyzed during this
study. Although workforce populations were included in the study, they were not
considered participants. These workforce members were not specifically selected for this
study and did not participate in any part of this study.

3.3 Materials and Instruments
Data (i.e., Process Inputs) for the safety culture indicators were gathered from
various sources (see Section 3.4) including the nuclear power plant’s corrective action
(incident) reporting systems (CAS), excluding proprietary, personal, and security
safeguards documentary materials. Approval to use these reporting systems was
appropriately obtained (Appendix B). Nuclear power plant CAS are computerized to
support collecting, sorting and analyzing performance trends. Instrumentation included a
standardized collection of trending criteria and codes, classified by key input types and
tabulated in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. A standardized coding structure with unique
designators (i.e., codes) is utilized by SPS to ensure consistency in the coding process.
Use of common trending codes resulted in identification of changes in frequency of
occurrence of a given parameter or a change in operational performance levels across a
wide range of areas at low detection thresholds (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
[INPO], 2007).
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3.4 Operational Definition of Process Inputs
The following are the key process inputs, accessing both the tangible and
intangible, to a typical nuclear safety culture process (NEI, 2010):
NRC inspection results
These include the baseline inspections of plant and processes (especially the
problem identification and resolution inspection which also looks at safety conscious
work environment and any past nuclear safety culture assessments), supplemental
inspections, and event follow-up. If an inspection finding identifies that a nuclear safety
culture issue may have caused the deficiency, the station in assessing its nuclear safety
culture can use this data. Recurring issues receive careful review to determine if other
process inputs are signaling problems in the same area (NEI, 2010).
Nuclear Safety Culture Self-Assessments
INPO SOER 02-4 recommendation 2 states: Conduct a self-assessment to
determine to what degree your organization has a healthy respect for nuclear safety and
that nuclear safety is not compromised by production priorities. The self-assessment
emphasizes the leadership skills and approaches necessary to achieve and maintain the
proper focus on nuclear safety. INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and
INPO Traits of a Health Nuclear Safety Culture are the basis for this self-assessment
(NEI, 2010).
Industry Evaluations
Evaluations conducted by outside organizations can provide valuable insights.
For example, INPO evaluations are conducted approximately every other year, ideally in
the alternate year from the nuclear safety culture assessment. Included in the INPO
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evaluation is an assessment of nuclear safety culture, resulting in a nuclear safety culture
assessment of a site almost every year (NEI, 2010).
Operating Experience (OE)
Information from other sites is available from INPO and NRC to improve
performance. Any operating experience (OPEX) items tagged as safety culture-related
by INPO or NRC are assessed for relevance to the station (NEI, 2010).
QA/Self-Assessment/Benchmarking/Behavioral Observations
Each site performs a variety of self-reviews. These include audits required in the
quality assurance programs, department self-assessments, and benchmarking of other
sites in the industry (or other industries). It also includes behavioral observations by
managers and supervisors in the field (NEI, 2010).
Employee Concerns Program (ECP)
This program provides opportunities to raise issues outside the normal chain of
command. ECP issues typically are not entered into the CAP, but ECP trends are
considered by the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP) (NEI, 2010).
Workforce Issues
These include data sources that could reflect concerns within the workforce that
may be precursors to nuclear safety culture or safety conscious work environment
(SCWE) issues, such as: grievance trends, potential SCWE claims, hostile work
environment claims, sexual harassment or peer on peer harassment, industrial safety
trends, disciplinary action review board trends, changes in compensation/incentive
programs, change management issues and workforce management issues (e.g., staffing,
knowledge transfer, or certification issues) (NEI, 2010).
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Corrective Action Program (CAP) Evaluations
In addition to being the program, that is used to identify, analyze and resolve
issues, the CAP is used to identify and evaluate trends across the entire data set of the
CAP, for example, by using key words. The data from root cause and apparent cause
evaluations also provide insights into potential nuclear safety culture issues and trends
(NEI, 2010).
Site Performance Trends
Each site has a broad suite of indicators to assess performance. These indicators
go beyond the NRC performance indicators and assess intermediate outcomes, which, if
not corrected, could lead to safety system failures, scrams (i.e., reactor trips) or other
events. Trends can be developed in these indicators and the cause of the trend – process
or design deficiencies, training, resources, or nuclear safety culture issues – can be
examined and corrective action taken. Examples include operator workarounds, control
room deficiencies, preventive maintenance deferred, and open positions (NEI, 2010).
The Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP) monitors the process
inputs, which are indicative of the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture; to
identify strengths and potential concerns that merit additional attention by the
organization. The SCMP collects process inputs for a defined time period; categorizes
process inputs; bins the inputs to safety culture attributes; sorts data by principle and
performs collegial challenge of aggregated data; looks for long term trends; provides
ratings and recommended actions; and reviews status and effectiveness of prior safety
culture-related actions.
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The Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT) is comprised of the senior-most
management personnel onsite charged with the safe operation of a nuclear plant. To
promote and monitor the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture, the SCRT
periodically (i.e., at least semi-annually) assesses the station against the INPO Principles
for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture. This self-critique is intended to be reflective and
performed by the SCRT itself in a group setting. During this review, the SCRT examines
a variety of information that reflects the health of the organization’s work environment to
discern trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges. The reports of
the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel and previous nuclear safety culture
assessments, INPO evaluation nuclear safety culture findings, and any insights from the
offsite nuclear safety review board (or equivalent) are reviewed by the SCRT prior to the
meeting. Although a variety of inputs may be considered during the self-critique, the
most valuable insight often comes from the frank discussion of nuclear safety culture
based on the SCRT’s observations and insights. As the organization’s senior leaders, the
SCRT possesses broad, diverse backgrounds in managing nuclear power plants and the
nuclear professionals that make up the workforce. The SCRT is often able to discern
subtle trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges from personal
interactions, in-field observations, and other means. The end result is an improved
understanding among the members of the SCRT of where their efforts to further improve
the station’s nuclear safety culture need to be applied.
The SCRT’s Nuclear Safety Culture Review is documented using the INPO
Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear
Safety Culture to identify strengths, areas found acceptable, and areas in need of
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improvement. Follow-up actions are tracked. Strengths and improvement opportunities
that are identified are communicated back to the organization to drive desired behaviors
and actions for fostering a strong nuclear safety culture.

3.5 Data Collection, Processing and Analysis
Data collection, processing and analysis consist of a number of steps that relate to
the three phases of the NSC Assessment with MCDA Process (Figure 2). Including the
collection of the process input data in the first phase, selection of the survey instrument to
conduct the degrees of belief assessment in the second phase and selection of the MCDA
model which will integrate these two in the third, and final, phase. It also covers the
research purpose (Figure 3), the research questions (Figure 4), as well as the research
contributions (Figure 5). It addresses the research limitations and it details the NSC
Assessment with MCDA Process. Finally, the research methodology addresses the
sensitivity analyses along with the preliminary verification and validation of the NSC
Assessment with MCDA Process. A comprehensive overview of the NSC Assessment
with MCDA Process methodology is illustrated in Figure 12.
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Research Purpose:
• Evaluate NSC health as a
function of belief and
tangible inputs integrated by
MCDA

Research Question 1:
• Can data be obtained at a
Nuclear Power Station that
has causality with NSC
health?

NSC MCDA Process Phase I:
• NSC Casuality Data
Selection

Research Limitations:
• Data Reviewed
• Existing NSC Monitoring
Process Inputs

Research Result:
• Existing NSC Monitoring
Process Inputs Selected

Research Question 2:
• Can the degree of belief of
NSC health by leadership at
a nuclear power station be
quantified for NSC Health?

NSC MCDA Process Phase II:
• Degree of belief survey
instrument selection

Research Limitations:

Research Result:
• Survey Monkey Selected

Research Question 3:
• Can MCDA be used to
integrate the degree of belief
of NSC health and the
process inputs into a
comprehensive methodology
to measure NSC Health?

NSC MCDA Process Phase
III:
• MCDA Model selection
• Assessment Integration

Research Limitations:
• MCDA Models Reviewed
• AHP
• ANP
• MAUT
• ER

Research Results:
• MCDA Model Selected
• ER
• Technology Selected
• IDS

Research Viability Testing
• Sensitivity Analysis
• Verification, Validation, and
Accreditation

Figure 12. Research Methodology

• Survey Instruments Reviewed
• Instant Survey
• Survey Monkey
• Survey Gizmo
• Zoomerang
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NSC MCDA Process Phase I
The first phase of this research reviewed and selected the existing Safety Culture
Monitoring Panel binning of Process Inputs. This process is conducted in accordance
with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 09-07, Fostering a Strong Nuclear
Safety Culture and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) document INPO 12012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture (Nuclear Energy Institute [NEI],
2010)(INPO, 2012a). The traits described in this document are divided into three
categories that are similar to the three categories of safety culture found in International
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, Safety Culture, (International Nuclear Safety Advisory
Group [INSAG], 1991) as illustrated in Figure 13. The categories and their primary traits
are as follows:
Individual Commitment to Safety with primary traits of: personal accountability,
questioning attitude and effective Safety Communication.
Management Commitment to Safety with primary traits of: leadership safety
values and actions, decision-making and respectful work environment.
Management Systems with primary traits of: continuous learning, problem
identification and resolution, environment for raising concerns and work processes.
Process Input binning data was obtained for the previous three years from SPS.
Based on the common codes for each of the ten indicators for a nuclear safety culture
(Section 3.4), appropriate plant incident reports from plant were identified and
subsequently evaluated to validate the coding and related trends. The data analysis is
expected to provide indication of both positive and adverse trends aligned with the
indicators of changes in a nuclear safety culture.
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Figure 13. Illustration of the presentation of safety culture
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NSC MCDA Process Phase II
The second phase of this research will develop a survey instrument to that will
allow the belief (qualitative) of the health performance of a NSC by leadership at a
nuclear power station to be quantified in terms of degrees of belief (quantitative). The
quantitative technique requires data collection with a field study an example of one of the
quantitative methods utilized (Haltiwanger, 2012). Under the umbrella of a field study is
the survey that is a means for describing, comparing, or explaining a group’s knowledge,
attitudes, and behaviors (Fink, 2003). Along the same lines Creswell (2005) states that
surveys “provides a quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of
a population by studying a sample of that population” (p. 153). Surveys provide for high
external validity (Bowen, 1995).
Important steps of the survey are setting objectives, designing the survey,
preparing a reliable and valid instrument, administering, analyzing, and reporting results
(Fink, 2003). The objectives for this survey are developed from the research questions.
Survey design considers the type of survey, types of questions asked, survey sampling,
sampling methods, sample size, and response rate. Types of surveys are selfadministered questionnaires, interviews, structured record reviews, and structured
observations. Self-administered questionnaires are surveys in which the individual
respondents complete themselves. Of the different types of self-administered
questionnaires the web-based survey was chosen. Advantages of a web-based survey
included cost, short collection time, and ease of data transfer (De Leeuw, 2008).
Open or closed questions can be asked. In open questions respondents provide
answers in their own words. In closed questions respondents choose from a
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predetermined set of answers. According to Fink, open questions allow respondents to
describe the world as they see it and in closed questions respondents answer questions as
the surveyor see it (Fink, 2003). Open questions must be interpreted and cataloged, and
unless the surveyor is trained in qualitative techniques complexity can arise in comparing
and interpreting the results. Closed questions are more difficult to construct but lend
themselves better to statistical analysis and interpretation (Fink, 2003). The survey for
this research utilizes closed questions.
Answers to closed questions can be nominal, ordinal, or numerical. Nominal
answers require respondents to place themselves in a category (i.e. male or female),
ordinal answers require respondents to rate the answer (i.e. very positive to very
negative), and numerical answers require respondent to give a number (i.e. age). The
survey will use ordinal answers to collect data on independent and dependent variables, a
mixture of nominal, ordinal, and numerical answers will be used to collect data on
moderating variables.
Two sampling methods are probability sampling and nonprobability sampling. In
probability sampling all members of the target population have a know probability of
being included in the survey. Probability sampling uses random sampling techniques.
While in a nonprobability sampling subjects are chosen by judgment and not all members
of the target population have a chance of being chosen. The main advantage to
nonprobability sampling is convenience and cost, while the main disadvantage is the
possibility of selection bias (Fink, 2003). Fink indicates that often nonprobability
sampling is appropriate for surveys. For this survey a nonprobability convenience
sample will be chosen.
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There is a wide range of recommendations for sample size based on total numbers
and participants per variable. Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998) recommend 15
to 20 observations per independent variable for generalizability, a minimum ratio of 5 to
1, and having at least 50 total observations when performing factor analysis. Gorsuch
(1983) repeats the recommendation for a minimum ratio of 5 to 1, while Everitt (1975)
recommends the ratio should be at least 10 to 1.
Response and non-response rate must be considered. Both non-response to an
entire survey and non-response to individual questions can introduce bias (Fink, 2003).
Fink lists identifying larger number of respondents, using surveys that interest the
respondents, sending reminders, and following up with non respondents as a few
measures to increase response rates (Fink, 2003). The population will be individuals in a
nuclear power station culture based environment that are were involved with NSC health
governance. Solicitations will be made through e-mail for individuals working in the
selected nuclear power station. A flow chart of the proposed survey development process
is illustrated in Figure 14.
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Identify Independent,
Dependent and
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Generate
Survey
Questions

Subject Matter Expert
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Survey
Participants

Administer
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Figure 14. Survey Development

The survey developed is shown in Appendix F. Table 2 lists the questions as they relate
to the independent, dependent, and moderating variables.
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Table 2. Question Categorization

Variable

Question Categorization
Questions
Independent Variables

Complete Integration of NSC into Ops

Intra (5, 10, 15, 20)

Significant Integration of NSC into Ops

Intra (6, 11, 16, 21)

Average Integration of NSC into Ops

Intra (7, 12, 17, 22)

Minimal Integration of NSC into Ops

Intra (8, 13, 18, 23)

Absence of Integration of NSC into Ops

Intra (9, 14, 18, 24)

Dependent Variables
Individual Commitment to Safety Items
binned per Quarter

5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Management Commitment to Safety Items
binned per Quarter

10, 11, 12, 13, 14

Management Systems Items binned per
Quarter

15, 16, 17, 18, 19

Individual Commitment, Management
Commitment and Management Systems Total 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
Items binned per Quarter
Moderating Variables
NSC Monitoring Experience

1

Employee Position

2

Military Nuclear Power Experience

3

Civilian Nuclear Power Experience

4

With respect to survey instruments the following are of particular concern:
Reliability - consistency between the measures of a construct.
Content validity - how well it covers the domain of the concept.
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Face validity - how well it appears to measure what it is intended to measure. Validity
will be increased by comparison with the existing NSC process.
Unidimensionality - how well the indicators represent a single concept?
Internal validity - the extent to which the correlation being tested is between the variables
and not an outside factor.
External validity - the extent to which the findings may be generalized.
Nomological validity - the extent to which the constructs relate to each other in a manner
consistent with theory (Ahire & Devaraj, 2001).
Reliability is increased in this survey by asking multiple questions for the same
factor. Validity is increased in this survey by comparison of results with the existing SPS
NSC monitoring process. Reliability and validity were both increased by use of the pilot
survey (Haltiwanger, 2012).
This survey instrument only underwent basic statistical analysis partially due to
the low maximum response size for one nuclear power station on the order of twelve
individuals. While this is a low number for statistical accuracy, it must be recalled that
the purpose of this survey is not to prove a hypothesis based on responses as would be
performed in deductive research. But rather the survey is an instrument to obtain belief
degrees from Subject Matter Experts in NSC at an operating commercial nuclear power
station to accomplish the goal of producing a MCDA model for NSC Performance health
ranking (i.e., inductive research). See Section 5.2 for recommendations with respect to
survey population increase in future research.
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NSC MCDA Process Phase III
The third phase of this research will determine a methodology for integrating
degrees of belief assessments with the process inputs in a MCDA model, which directly
relates to the third assessment integration phase. Four MCDA models: Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP), Analytic Network Process (ANP), Multi Attribute Utility
Theory (MAUT) and Evidential Reasoning (ER) will be evaluated for their utility in
integrating the binned process inputs and degrees of belief information with the best
candidate to be selected for implementation. This final phase (assessment integration) is
the most crucial. Many approaches exist that could integrate the Process Input binning
and degrees of belief assessments. Based on the goal of this research, the result of this
phase of the MCDA methodology must characterize the health of the NSC.

Multi Criteria Decision Analysis Models
The research is dependent upon the MCDA model used to integrate the degrees of
belief and the Process Inputs assessments. Options for an integrated NSC Health
assessment methodology include AHP, ANP, ER, and MAUT. However, each of these
approaches would require complex software with the research; therefore, it is valuable to
analyze these different alternatives in order to select the most appropriate MCDA model.

Analytic Hierarchy Process
This hierarchy provides a means for systematically evaluating the complex
problem of ranking NSC Health. It also provides a method for quantifying the relative
weights of different criteria and factors making it easier to compare incommensurable
items (e.g., loss of life versus loss of money). However, AHP is not without criticism.
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When ranking alternatives in terms of their attributes, some experts would argue that as
new alternatives are added to a problem, the ranking of the old alternatives must not
change; in other words, rank reversal should not be permitted. However, as we all have
experienced, especially in the realm of commercial nuclear power, new sometimes
alternatives do (and should) cause rank reversal. For example, the Fukushima Daiichi
beyond design basis tsunami was considered a black swan event, unforeseeable, and
forever changing the landscape of NSC assessments. Most AHP software can handle
both approaches, either allowing for rank reversal or not, depending on the preference of
the user. Furthermore, AHP is sensitive to the hierarchical model proposed. If the model
were incomplete, or otherwise inadequate, then all results of the AHP would be
questionable. The AHP model would need to be vetted with stakeholders and experts, in
the hopes of adequately reflecting the complex decision making problem of integrating
degrees of belief of NSC healthy and the tangible process inputs assessments to rank
NSC Health Performance.

Analytic Network Process
While both AHP and ANP use pairwise comparisons to measure weights and rank
alternatives, there are some fundamental differences between these two approaches
(Figure 15). AHP structures a decision problem as a hierarchy with a goal, decision
criteria, and alternatives. It also requires independence of all elements in the hierarchy,
so the decision criteria must be independent, and the alternatives to be considered must
also be independent, not only from each other, but also from the decision criteria. ANP,
on the other hand, does not require independence among elements. Often there is
interdependence among alternatives and decision criteria, so this is an improvement over
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AHP. The way ANP handles this is to structure the decision problem as a network,
which might be useful for the purposes of our research as degrees of belief of NSC health
and the tangible process inputs are most likely interrelated, not independent.

AHP
•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank
alternatives
•Structures a decision problem as a
hierarchy
•Requires independence of all elements
in the hierarchy

ANP
•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank
alternatives
•Structures a decision problem as a
network
•Does not require independence of all
elements

Figure 15. Analytic Hierarchy Process versus Analytic Network Process

Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)
MAUT builds utility functions for multiple attributes, independently, then
combines these utility functions using weighted multi attribute models (additive models
are common, but more complicated models exist). Next, the indifference probability
between a sure thing and a gamble must be determined. This requires strong assumptions
of independence, including (mutual) preferential independence and (mutual) utility
independence. Attribute Y is preferentially independent of X if preferences for specific
outcomes of Y do not depend on the level of X. For example, say that Y is number of
days to complete a job, maybe 5 or 10 days with the cost to perform the job, X, is either
$100 or $200. Assume that the cost is $100 no matter what, whether it takes 5 days or 10
days. If we prefer a 5-day time frame, then even if we raise the cost to $200 (again, for
both 5 and 10 days), then we would still prefer 5 days. In this case, Y is preferentially
independent of X. For mutual preferential independence, we also need X to be
preferentially independent of Y, so we need to prefer the lower cost, no matter how many
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days it takes to perform the job. Utility independence is basically a stronger form of
preferential independence. Y is utility independent of X if preferences for uncertain
choices involving different levels of Y are independent of the value of X. That is, if there
were a 50% chance that Y is 5 days, and a 50% chance that Y is 10 days, then regardless
of whether X is fixed at $100 or $200, we would still prefer 5 days. For mutual utility
independence, then we just need to reverse X and Y and see if the independence still
holds. If these assumptions were validated, then we would set up a reference gamble to
determine the indifference probability. In our example, the sure thing would be that X is
some cost between the best case (X+) and worse case (X-) scenarios ($100 ≤ X ≤ $200),
and Y would be some duration for the job to be completed. In this case Y+ would be the
lesser of the two values, assuming we wish the job to be completed in a shorter period of
time, so Y+ ≤ Y ≤ Y- (or 5 ≤ Y ≤ 10). We are interested in the utility, U(X, Y) versus the
utility of a gamble. The gamble would have two scenarios based on a chance outcome.
There is a best-case scenario, (X+, Y+) or ($100, 5), which has probability p. There is
also a worst-case scenario, (X-, Y-) or ($200, 10), which has probability 1-p. Then we
find p such that we are indifferent between the sure thing and the gamble.
However, these assumptions of independence do not always hold. Without the
assumptions of independence, MAUT could become extremely challenging to
implement. Furthermore, this model requires significantly more time in order to conduct
these reference gambles and determine each respondent’s utility. Due to lack of
resources, MAUT is not a viable option for this research. In fact, regardless of resources,
the model does not lend itself to integrating the types of data available for degrees of
belief of NSC healthy and the tangible process indicators of NSC health (Hill, 2012).
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Evidential Reasoning
An appealing option for a MCDA NSC integrated assessment methodology is
Evidential Reasoning (ER), which deals with problems having both quantitative and
qualitative criteria under uncertainty, such as ignorance or randomness (Huynh,
Nakamori, Ho, & Murai, 2006). It is used to support decision analyses, assessments, or
evaluation activities. It addresses the decision problem using a belief structure to model
an assessment with uncertainty, a belief decision matrix to represent a problem under
uncertainty, ER algorithms to aggregate criteria for generating distributed assessments,
and belief and plausibility functions to generate a utility interval which measures the
degree of ignorance.
Both ER and AHP use a hierarchy to model a MCDA problem; however, ER
differs from AHP in a several ways. With AHP all of the alternatives comprise the
lowest level of the hierarchy, but with ER the alternatives are not included in the
hierarchy at all (Xu & Yang, 2001). Further, ER uses a generalized decision matrix
where each element of the matrix is an assessment of a given attribute using belief
degrees. The decision matrix in AHP merely describes the relative importance of one
attribute over another; therefore, “ER can be used to assess an alternative against a set of
standards, while AHP can only compare the relative importance between attributes” (Xu
& Yang, 2001). Finally, ER aggregates the belief degrees of lower level attributes to
higher level attributes gradually, until it achieves an overall score, whereas AHP
aggregates average scores based on pairwise comparison (Xu & Yang, 2001). One
implication of these differences is that ER can tackle large-scale MCDA problems
(without limits on the number of alternatives or attributes). In addition, as new attributes
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are added, an ER model does not need to be re-evaluated since each attribute is scored for
each alternative separately. ER also does not suffer from a common AHP problem
known as rank reversal, which can occur when new attributes are added to an AHP
model. Perhaps most importantly, ER can handle mixed data, including random and
deterministic, qualitative and quantitative, as well as incomplete data for some attributes.
Furthermore, ER can incorporate AHP procedures into certain aspects of a model, such as
using pairwise comparisons to weight attributes against each other (Xu & Yang, 2001).

MCDA Software Selection Result
While most conventional MCDM methods use a decision matrix for problem
modeling, the ER approach uses a belief decision matrix, of which the conventional
decision matrix is a special case. In a belief decision matrix, a distribution instead of a
single value is used to represent an alternative’s performance on an attribute. For
example, if a company is assessed to be Excellent on short-term planning and Poor on
long-term planning, it would then be described as Average on Planning in a decision
matrix, while in a belief decision matrix, this would be a distribution of {[Excellent
50%], [Average, 0], [Poor, 50%]}. A modified Dempster’s evidence combination
algorithm is used for aggregating the information in the belief decision matrix. The
aggregation process is nonlinear, and in essence a probabilistic approach. The outcome
of the aggregation is also a distribution, not a single score, of an alternative’s
performance on the top attribute. However, a score can be calculated from the
distribution by adding each assessment grade value weighted by the associated belief
degree in the distribution. However the score will normally be different from weighted
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sum method because the distribution is generated through a nonlinear aggregation
process (Xu, McCarthy, & Yang, 2005).
There are two general advantages in employing the ER approach for MCDM.
Firstly, it provides a novel belief framework to model and synthesize subjective
information. Secondly the ER approach can make full use of different types of data,
including subjective judgments, probabilistic data, and incomplete data under weaker
assumptions that may undermine other methods such as MAVT. For example, it requires
only the satisfaction of value independence condition, which is easy to check and satisfy,
in order to apply the ER approach for attribute aggregation, not the stringent preferential
independence condition required by the multiple value function theory (MAVT). When
there are only a few attributes, it may be manageable to check the satisfaction of the
preferential independence conditions. It becomes much more difficult when attribute
number increases beyond a handful. Therefore decision scientists normally recommend
carefully selecting only a small number of attributes, such as 9 or up to a few tens, when
structuring a MCDM problem. In self-assessment, the above general advantages of the
ER approach can be transformed into the following three practical advantages. Firstly the
belief decision matrix provides flexibilities in question presentation and data collection.
Secondly, the ER aggregation process generates more insight information on
performance diversities and supports the identification of strengths and weaknesses.
Thirdly, the number of attribute (or questions) in the assessment model is much less a
concern to the ER approach than to other conventional approaches (Xu et al., 2005).
In conclusion, software for AHP is widely available but can be very expensive.
Software for ANP and MAUT are not as common. Consequently, ER is the prudent

97
choice for the NSC MCDA Health Performance research and conveniently, there is free
ER software available with limited but sufficient attributes for the research. Furthermore,
the ER software can communicate health performance and decisions through graphical
data visualizations, making it a logical choice for this research.

3.6 Methodological Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations
As noted by Schein (2004), the basic defining dimensions of an organizational
culture are not directly observable, thus valid indications and measurements of these
dimensions are difficult to establish. Although there are a variety of quantitative and
qualitative methods available to measure the psychological, behavioral, and situational
aspects of safety cultures in high-risk industries, methods to measure work process
aspects of safety cultures are limited (Cooper, 2000). As indicated in the review of the
literature, various aspects of safety culture have been examined through observations and
assessments of management and control records. Employee attitudes, values, and beliefs
can be measured by a survey, but only through observations of worker performance or
through reviews of event records are the application of these cultural aspects confirmed
(Roughton & Mercurio, 2002).
Data gathered from plant event records minimized spatial and respondent
behavior limitations and analysis by a single researcher mitigated researcher bias
concerns. Gathering data from plant event records is an unobtrusive measurement
process and does have a limitation relative to researcher control over the types of data
collected (Trochim, 2001). Analysis techniques of content analysis through standardized
coding applications were in use at Surry Power Station for Binning the Process inputs
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that mitigated most other forms of bias. The use of the standardized codes encapsulates
human judgment in assigning the codes to power plant event records, which can only be
addressed through a qualitative observational study.
History effects at Surry Power Station affected the validity of this study.
Organizational changes, including management changes occurred during the data
collection period. A limitation of this study is that the research did not consider the effect
of organizational changes.

3.7 Ethical Assurances
This research assessed the health of a nuclear safety culture at a commercial
nuclear power plant in the United States. Proprietary, personal, and nuclear safeguards
information was excluded from the corrective action documents reviewed. Personal and
social harm was avoided. Data obtained from nuclear power plant corrective action
systems based on trend codes are recorded in such a manner that human subjects cannot
be identified directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects. This research was
based on the concept of grouped information, for which no identifiable private
information was obtained on human subjects. Furthermore, data were not obtained
through intervention or interaction with any individuals. This research project did not,
therefore, meet the definition of human subject research as specified in the Code of
Federal Regulations Title 45, Part 46, and was in compliance with the standards of the
Old Dominion University Institutional Review Board (IRB) (Appendix A).
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CHAPTER 4
4. RESULTS

This research investigated the ability to integrate survey instrument degrees of
belief results and MCDA into a comprehensive methodology to measure NSC Health
Performance. The basis of this research was a detailed literature review showing that
there is strong interest in maintaining a healthy NSC and that there was a wide gap in the
body of knowledge in this area. The literature review went further to identify a specific
gap in the body of knowledge for accurately measuring the health performance of a NSC.
From the literature review, a conceptual model was formed and research questions were
built. A survey was developed, vetted through peer review and distributed. Solicitations
for participation were made via the Internet and data were collected. A quantitative data
analysis was performed followed by a qualitative interpretation. This degrees of belief
data were then utilized in Evidential Reasoning Software to address the questions that are
the focus of this research (Figure 16. Three Phases of the NSC Assessment with
Evidential Reasoning). The results of this analysis follow.
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I. Deterministic Phase
Binned NSC Process Inputs
from Previous Years:
• Corrective Action Program
• NSC Assessments
• Industry Evaluations of NSC
• Site Performance Trends
• Operating Experience
• Quality Assurance Items
• Other Self Assessments

II. Qualitative/Quantitative Phase
Degrees of Belief Psychometric
Survey
Respondents: 12 Experts
Software: Survey Monkey
Data: Collected via Survey
Data Analysis: Proportions as
Belief Degrees Weighting

III. MCDA (ER) Phase
Integration of Binned Process
Inputs and Degrees of Belief in
Developed NSC Health ER
IDS Software Model
Inputs:
• Binned NSC Process Inputs
• Degree of Belief Weighting
Output:
• NSC Health Ranking

Figure 16. Three Phases of the NSC Assessment with Evidential Reasoning

4.1 Phase I: Binned NSC Process Inputs Results
Nuclear safety culture evolves over time; therefore, it is also appropriate to review
any evidence of problems on a frequent, ongoing basis. Personnel and organizational
changes, budget challenges, handling of emergent issues, and day-to-day organizational
dynamics can have a profound impact on what is viewed as important and hence can
influence the behaviors and nuclear safety culture at the plant and across the organization.
Many sources of data may indicate a potential nuclear safety culture issue. Examples of
such sources include station performance indicators, NRC inspection reports, the
corrective action program (CAP), the employee concerns program, audits and quality
control inspections, self-assessments, benchmarking, workforce issues, and others
identified elsewhere in this document (NEI, 2014).
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The CAP is the largest single source of potential input to the culture monitoring
process. Important causal investigations are considered for inclusion in the culture
monitoring process. The causes and contributors or other latent weaknesses identified are
examined for possible safety cultural implications. “Good catches”, CAP trends,
anonymous reports, and other CAP feedback are considered for additional insights. In
addition, at Surry Power Station (SPS) the CAP process also captures issues that are not
adverse to quality. These lower-tier issues are examined for safety culture insights. In
general, special consideration is given to CAP entries that appear to be emotionally
charged, carry negative tones, or indicate current frustration or dissatisfaction with
procedures, processes, resources, or other organizational deficiencies. Special
consideration is also given to entries expressing concerns about the ability of the
management team to address repetitive or longstanding issues or expressing lack of
respect or trust (NEI, 2014).
In addition to CAP data, the following data types are considered high yield inputs
important for consideration of cultural implications.
Regulatory Communications – This category includes items that arise from
communications with regulatory agencies and are not already in CAP. “Regulatory
agencies” include the NRC, other federal regulators (e.g., NERC, EPA), and state and
local agencies. The regulatory communications items to capture are those appearing to
have safety culture implications.
Assessments – This category includes periodic and ad hoc assessments directly
focused on nuclear safety culture behaviors, such as nuclear safety culture assessments
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(NSCAs). Other assessments may also be included if they address safety culture
behaviors or appear to have other safety culture implications.
Industry Evaluations – This includes evaluations conducted by outside
organizations (e.g., INPO, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), Nuclear Electric Insurance
Limited (NEIL)). For example, INPO evaluations are conducted approximately every
other year, ideally in the alternate year from the nuclear safety culture assessment.
Included in the INPO evaluation is an assessment of nuclear safety culture, resulting in a
nuclear safety culture assessment of a site almost every year. These industry evaluations
are available to NRC on site and are checked for safety culture implications (NEI, 2014).
The following lower yield data types, that may be less rich in signs of cultural
health, are considered on a case-by-case basis.
Operating Experience – Company-internal operating experience (OE) can provide
site-specific insights about safety culture behaviors. Nuclear industry OE programs and
processes often provide insights that highlight weaknesses in safety culture behaviors.
The insights gathered from reviews of internal OE often provide additional detail and
perspectives which complement information available in the CAP evaluation of those
events. External OE is evaluated to determine if the safety culture behaviors in those
events are being exhibited at the site. Comparison of external OE with what the site has
learned through its internal OE can help draw attention to the importance and relevance
of the site’s own safety culture behaviors.
Quality Assurance Items – This category includes items identified through quality
assurance audits and/or assessments that have apparent safety culture implications. SPS
considers QA items as a potential input for the safety culture monitoring process.
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Self-Assessments – This category includes items identified through performancebased self-assessments that appear to have safety culture implications. SPS considers
self-assessment items as a potential input for the safety culture monitoring process.
Benchmarking/Observations – This category includes items from the wide variety
of benchmarking activities involving other sites, companies, or industries. It also
includes observations by managers and supervisors in the field that may provide insights
about cultural health.
Site Performance Trends – SPS has a broad suite of indicators to assess
performance and are more indicative of individual/organization behaviors and values that
support nuclear safety. Trends are developed from these indicators and the cause of the
trend – behaviors, process, training, resources, or leadership – is examined for corrective
action. Examples include operator work-arounds, control room deficiencies, deferred
preventive maintenance, timeliness and effectiveness of corrective action, system health,
leadership effectiveness and site staffing, fitness for duty and access authorizations.
Miscellaneous Sources – SPS also considers optional inputs from such sources as:
the station oversight organization; plant health reports; vendor-generated nuclear safety
culture data such as surveys, audits, and assessments; human performance data such as
site or department “clock resets”; and training feedback (NEI, 2014).
The following are other additional low value inputs that come directly to the
attention of site senior management and are important in assessing nuclear safety culture,
but, due to the sensitive, confidential nature of the information must have all identifying
information removed prior to being handled by the nuclear safety culture monitoring
panel.
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Allegations – These include concerns reported directly to the NRC by site
employees and contractors, and NRC requests for information needed for their
investigation of allegations.
Workforce Issues - These include data sources that could reflect concerns within
the workforce that may be precursors to nuclear safety culture or safety conscious work
environment (SCWE) issues, such as: grievance trends, potential SCWE claims, hostile
work environment claims, sexual harassment or peer on peer harassment, industrial safety
trends, disciplinary action review board trends, changes in compensation /incentive
programs, change management issues and workforce management issues (e.g., staffing,
knowledge transfer, or certification issues).
Employee Concerns Program (ECP) - This program provides opportunities to
raise issues outside the normal chain of command.
These process inputs are then collegiately vetted and binned by the Nuclear Safety
Culture Monitoring Panel members into the following ten traits divided into three
categories.
I.

Individual Commitment to Safety, which includes the following traits:
PA. Personal Accountability
All individuals take personal responsibility for safety. Responsibility and

authority for nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood. Reporting
relationships, positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize the overriding
importance of nuclear safety.
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QA. Questioning Attitude
Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions,
assumptions, anomalies, and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result
in error or inappropriate action. All employees are watchful for assumptions, values,
conditions, or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant safety.
CO. Safety Communication
Communications maintain a focus on safety. Safety communication is broad and
includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-level
communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and documentation. Leaders
use formal and informal communication to convey the importance of safety. The flow of
information up the organization is seen as important as the flow of information down the
organization.
II.

Management Commitment to Safety, which includes the following traits:
LA. Leadership Accountability
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.

Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and
demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety message is
communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders
throughout the nuclear organization set an example for safety. Corporate policies
emphasize overriding importance of nuclear safety.
DM. Decision-Making
Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and
thorough. Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when
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faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the plant in a safe condition.
Senior leaders support and reinforce conservative decisions.
WE. Respectful Work Environment
Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a respectful work
environment. A high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, in part,
through timely and accurate communication. Differing professional opinions are
encouraged, discussed, and resolved in a timely manner. Employees are informed of
steps taken in response to their concerns.
III.

Management Systems, which includes the following traits:
CL. Continuous Learning
Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out, and implemented.

Operating experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well
developed. Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning
and improve performance. Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a
variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide an independent “fresh look.”
PI. Problem Identification and Resolution
Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and
promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance. Identification
and resolution of a broad spectrum of problems, including organizational issues, are used
to strengthen safety and improve performance.
RC. Environment for Raising Concerns
A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel
feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or
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discrimination. The station creates, maintains, and evaluates policies and processes that
allow personnel to freely raise concerns.
WP. Work Processes
The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that
safety is maintained. Work management is a deliberate process in which work is
identified, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, and critiqued. The entire
organization is involved in and fully supports the process.
A summary of the SPS quarterly process input binning from the second quarter of
2012 through the first quarter of 2015 is illustrated in Figure 17, Figure 18 , and Figure
19. Example minutes from a Surry Power Station NSCMP meeting are located in
Appendix C. The binned process inputs values for the last three rolling years are located
in Appendix D (Table 5). Approval to utilize this SPS data was appropriately obtained
and is contained in Appendix B.

Figure 17. Quarterly Process Inputs Binning 2Q 2012 through 1Q 2013
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Figure 18. Quarterly Process Inputs Binning 2Q 2013 through 1Q 2014

Figure 19. Quarterly Process Inputs Binning 2Q 2014 through 1Q 2015
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4.2 Phase II: Degrees of Belief Survey Results
The survey was developed to obtain the degrees of belief, by leadership at a
nuclear power station, between binned process input magnitude and NSC health
performance. Request for approval was submitted to and granted by the Old Dominion
University Institutional Review Board (IRB), Appendix A (p. 172).
The survey was then piloted to a group of subject matter experts. Participation in
the survey was voluntary and the participants were informed they could decline to
participate in the survey at any point in the process without risk of any adverse
implications or effects. The participants of the pilot remained anonymous in the final
documentation of results. The pilot survey is shown in Appendix E.
The results of the pilot were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed. Qualitative
analysis was conducted by reviewing the comments section for each question and the
comment section for the survey as a whole. The survey instrument was modified using
information gained from the quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Various on-line services were investigated as potential vehicles for distribution of
the survey. Examples of services investigated were “Instant Survey”, “Survey Gizmo”,
“Survey Monkey”, and “Zoomerang”. After evaluating each for cost, ease of survey
development, survey types, distribution methods, visual appeal, and how the results were
packaged “Survey Monkey” (www.surveymonkey.com) was chosen. The final survey
(Appendix F) is, as it appears developed through “Survey Monkey”. All survey
responses were anonymous and none of the information could be tracked back to any
individual or company, directly or indirectly. To solicit participation a link to the survey
was e-mailed by the survey author to twelve individuals that are members of the NSC
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Monitoring Teams at Surry Power Station. These selected individuals had a mean value
of 31.5 years of commercial nuclear power experience and with a mean value of 4.13
years experience on a NSC monitoring panel.
There were a total of eight responses and the categorization of the responses is
shown in Appendix G: Survey Results (p. 206). While this is a low number for statistical
accuracy, it must be recalled that the purpose of the survey was not to prove a hypothesis
based on responses as would be performed in deductive research. But rather the survey
was an instrument to obtain belief degrees from Subject Matter Experts in NSC at an
operating commercial nuclear power station to accomplish the goal of producing a
MCDA model for NSC Performance health ranking (i.e., inductive research).
It was known how many individuals were contacted (twelve) and how many
responses were received (eight) for a response rate of 66.6%. Additionally, by using a
built-in function selection in “Survey Monkey” the respondents were not allowed to
partially fill out a survey. All questions for the Independent and Dependent variables had
to be answered in order to submit the survey. To help ensure internal validity was
maintained it was determined that all questions on each variable be answered in order to
complete the survey.
Basic statistical analysis was conducted based on the discussion laid out in the
Methodology section of this paper (Section 3). Survey results were obtained from Survey
Monkey and are contained in Appendix G (p. 206) and results illustrated by Figure 20,
Figure 21, Figure 22, Figure 23, and Figure 24.
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Figure 20. Belief Degrees Survey Results (p. 1)
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Figure 21. Belief Degrees Survey Results (p. 2)
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Figure 22. Belief Degrees Survey Results (p. 3)
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Figure 23. Belief Degrees Survey Results (p. 4)

115

Figure 24. Belief Degrees Survey Results (p. 5)
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4.3 Phase III: MCDA (Evidential Reasoning) Model Results
An Evidential Reasoning Model was developed, with Intelligent Decision System
(IDS) software (Intelligent Decision System Version 1.2), for the determination of NSC
Health utilizing the binned process input data obtained from SPS and the degrees of
belief data obtained from the survey conducted at SPS.
This model consists of twelve NSC Health Alternatives, which are the past twelve
quarters of NSC Process Data Binning results for SPS (i.e., SPS 2012 Q2 through SPS
2015 Q1).
In order to determine the value of the Level 1 NSC Performance Attribute for
each Quarter of a year Alternative there are three Level 2 Attributes (Individual
Commitment to Safety, Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems)
that receive the binned process input data via ten Level 3 Attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA,
DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP). The model also utilizes weighting to determine the
contribution of the Level 2 and 3 Attributes to the Level 1 Attribute, utilities to determine
the relationship between the binned process input data and the Child Attributes and two
sets of belief degrees. One is used to relate the grades of Child and Father Attributes, the
other to determine the beliefs held for the process input data selected within each Child
Attribute for each Alternative.
While this model is relatively simple, it is extensible and could easily address
additional layers of complexity from an increase in the number of Alternatives under
study, to a more complex description of the father and child Attributes (e.g., adding
additional sub-categories or Child Attributes to each of the ten NSC Traits).
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The utility of ER, and the IDS software for implementing ER, is its simple
structure, which can be organized into many combinations of Attributes and Alternatives
making it easy to implement, but capable of handling complex problems without
overcomplicating them.

Figure 25. IDS NSC Model (List-Tree View)

An example of how this model appears in the IDS Software List-Tree View is
shown in Figure 25. In the IDS model display window, users can opt to select View >
Dialog Box View to see a more visual version of the model (Figure 26).
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Figure 26. IDS NSC Model (Dialog Box View)

The yellow colored boxes hold the information for Alternatives, including the
Alternative name at the top, the ranking in the bottom left and the utility value in the
bottom right. The cyan colored boxes are used for inputting and displaying information
for Attributes: the Attribute name is at the top, the weight of the Attribute in the bottom
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left and the value of the Attribute (in case of a quantitative attribute) or average utility
value of the attribute (in case of an qualitative one) in the bottom right.
Each of the Level 3 Attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) was
defined in IDS as quantitative; however, ER can integrate both qualitative and
quantitative data, and IDS provides that option when defining attributes. For example, if
the attribute is defined as quantitative, then the user can also decide whether it is a certain
or uncertain attribute. This is useful for defining stochastic quantitative attributes, which
could be random variables with some underlying distribution, may be difficult to assess,
or could suffer from missing data. The steps to program uncertainty information in IDS
ER are illustrated in Figure 27, Figure 28, and Figure 29.
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Figure 27. Programming Uncertainty in IDS ER (Step 1)
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Figure 28. Programming Uncertainty in IDS ER (Step 2)

Figure 29. Programming Uncertainty in IDS ER (Step 3)

Utilities for the Level 1 or overall attribute (NSC Performance) were assigned to
these grades (from a linguistic set of Absent Integration of NSC into Operations, Minimal
Integration of NSC into Operations, Average Integration of NSC into Operations,
Significant Integration of NSC into Operations, and Complete Integration of NSC into
Operations) as shown in Table 3. The utilities were chosen arbitrarily, but during future
research, how to assess and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs for the ER
model could be explored. These values could easily be revised in future iterations of the
model. For the purposes of this dissertation, Complete Integration of NSC into
Operations would be ideal and thus would receive a Utility of 1. The remaining grades
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were ranked accordingly with utilities juxtaposed to probabilities not necessarily
summing to 1.

Table 3. Grades and Utilities

Grade
Absent Integration of NSC into Operations
Minimal Integration of NSC into Operations
Average Integration of NSC into Operations
Significant Integration of NSC into Operations
Complete Integration of NSC into Operations

Utility [0,1]
0
.25
.5
.75
1

To relate father and child attributes, the following belief degrees were used for each child
(PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP). These values could also be adjusted easily in
future iterations of the model. For example, future research could conduct a survey for each of
the respective child attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) with the results
entered as belief degrees father grade of Absent, Minimal, Average, Significant or Complete.
However, in the interest of keeping this model simple, belief degrees were assigned at this level
(i.e., for the Level 3 child to Level 2 father attributes) using the identity matrix (Table 4). The
belief degrees that relate these father and child grades are not the same belief degrees that were
selected by respondents during data collection via survey when they chose the grade (i.e., Absent,
Minimal, Average, Significant or Complete) they deemed appropriate for the Level 2 child to
Level 1 father attributes.
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Table 4. Belief Degrees for Relating Father and Child Grades

Father
Grade/ Child
Grade
Absent
Minimal
Average
Significant
Complete

Absent

Minimal

Average

1
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0

Significant Complete
0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
1

Weights are then used to relate the child attributes to the father attribute. This can
be done using visual scoring or using a pairwise comparison of attributes. Again, future
versions of the model could work with respondents or subject matter experts to complete
the pairwise comparison approach provided with the IDS software, which is basically an
AHP approach for weighting the child attributes. However, for this study the visual
scoring approach was utilized with normalized selected to ensure the weights added to 1,
and the weights as equal (i.e., .33, .33 and .33) (Figure 30).
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Figure 30. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring

Using the binned process inputs for the last three rolling years (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL,
PI, RC, WP) (Appendix D Table 5), the IDS model can now rank the twelve Alternatives
(Quarterly NSC Performance) based on the attributes, grades, and associated utilities, belief
degrees, and weights. The user can select Report > Graph Ranking within IDS to obtain the
overall ranking of alternatives on NSC Performance, the level 1 father attribute (Figure 31). The
user can also select Report > Visual Comparison to see further breakdowns of the first five
alternatives across the level 1 father attribute and its three child attributes (Figure 32).
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Figure 31. Dynamic Prioritization of NSC Health Performance

Figure 32. Alternative Performances Across Child Attributes
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Figure 33. SPS 2015 Q1 on Nuclear Safety Culture Performance

Figure 33 can be obtained by highlighting the alternative of interest, then
selecting Report > Graph Belief Degree > Att at Alt, where the last selection means,
“Attribute at Alternative”. That is, whichever combination of attribute and alternative are
highlighted at the time this report is run will be used to create the chart. This chart shows
the breakdown of grades for SPS 2015 Q1 NSC Performance (with the lowest overall risk
in the model for which degrees of belief was weighted lower than the other attributes) at
the father attribute level (NSC Performance). This gives an overall distribution of the
calculated grades and belief degrees for NSC Performance (level 1 attribute), based on
the grades and belief degrees for the level 2 child attributes (Individual Commitment to
Safety, Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems). The individual
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level 2 attributes can also create similar charts to explore belief degrees using level 3
child attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP).
Another informative chart that is available in IDS is the radar plot. By plotting
the values of all of the child attributes, alongside the father attribute, it is easy to see
which of the child attributes might be driving the overall NSC Performance score. In
IDS, users can select Report > Visual Comparison, then select the Tool Bar button to
obtain a menu of options. One of the options is an icon displaying the type of chart
selected, and by selecting it; users see a drop-down list of chart types, including the radar
plot. The default view of this chart is three-dimensional, however, clicking the icon that
looks like a set of three-dimensional glasses will recalibrate the view to two dimensions.
Because we are exploring twelve alternatives, it may be difficult to compare them all on
the same radar plot. However, by highlighting alternatives and using the Select One,
Select Group, Select All, Deselect, and Draw buttons we are able to explore alternatives
individually (Figure 34, Figure 35, Figure 36).
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Figure 34. Example NSC Health Performance and Categories Radar Plot

Figure 35. Example NSC Health Performance and Traits Radar Plot 4 Qtr’s
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Figure 36. Example NSC Health Performance and Traits Radar Plot 12 Qtr’s

Sensitivity Analysis
IDS offers built-in sensitivity analyses. Figure 37 displays a trade-off analysis
chart, found under Sensitivity > Trade-Off Analysis, which shows the overall NSC
Performance for the twelve alternatives compared with Individual Commitment to Safety.
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Figure 37. Individual Commitment to Safety and NSC Perf. Trade-Off Analysis

Figure 38 displays overall NSC Performance for the twelve alternatives compared
with Management Commitment to Safety.
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Figure 38. Management Commitment to Safety and NSC Perf. Trade-Off Analysis

Figure 39 displays overall NSC Performance for the twelve alternatives
compared with Management Systems.
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Figure 39. Management Systems and NSC Performance Trade-Off Analysis

IDS can produce sensitivity analyses based on the weighting of individual
attributes, which look at the overall father attribute ranking, or the rank change, of
alternatives. Users can select the attribute for which they wish to perform sensitivity
analyses (e.g., Individual Commitment to Safety), then click Sensitivity > Change
Weight. This brings up a dialog box where the user can select which alternatives to
explore (e.g., SPS 2012 Q2 through Q4). Initially presented are the weights originally
input for the model as shown in Figure 40. By selecting Ranking, users can manually
adjust the weights of the child attributes to see how that affects the overall ranking of
alternatives. Weights do not remain normalized automatically; consequently, weights for
the child attributes were selected that summed to 1 (Figure 41). Adjusting the weights of

133
the child attributes, we can see how that affects the overall risk scores for the father
attribute across each of the alternatives.

Figure 40. Child Attributes on Ranking (Original)

Figure 41. Child Attributes on Ranking (Manually Adjusted)

Alternately, by selecting Rank Change, we can produce a more controlled
sensitivity analysis on individual child attributes. The graphic given in Figure 42
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displays the overall NSC Performance scores for the first three alternatives as the weight
of the Individual Commitment to Safety attribute is varied from 0 through 1. It is
interesting to note that the overall score for each alternative varies with the weight of the
Individual Commitment to Safety attribute, but it is not a linear relationship. All of the
selected alternatives increase as the weight of Individual commitment to safety increases.

Figure 42. Sensitivity Analysis of Individual Commitment to Safety

The graphic given in Figure 43 displays the overall NSC Performance scores for
the first three alternatives as the weight of the Management Commitment to safety
attribute is varied from 0 through 1. It is interesting to note that the overall score for the
majority of the alternatives vary with the weight of the Management Commitment to
Safety attribute, but it is not a linear relationship. Furthermore, while the majority of the
NSC Performance scores increase as the weight of Management Commitment to safety
increases, SPS 2012 Q2 does not change.
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Figure 43. Sensitivity Analysis of Management Commitment to Safety

The graphic given in Figure 44 displays the overall NSC Performance scores for
the first three alternatives as the weight of the Management Systems attribute is varied
from 0 through 1. It is interesting to note that the overall score for the first three
alternatives vary with the weight of the Management Systems attribute, but it is not a
linear relationship. Furthermore, while the majority of the NSC Performance scores
increase as the weight of Management Commitment to safety increases, SPS 2012 Q4
demonstrates a negative correlation.
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Figure 44. Sensitivity Analysis of Management Systems

IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses of belief degrees based on adjusting the
child attribute weights. From the same dialog box, the user simply selects Belief Degree.
This shows the belief degrees for the degrees of belief attribute related to the
grades (our linguistic set) based on the weights input for the child attributes (PA, QA,
CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP). Notice as the child attributes are adjusted up and
down the belief degree values of the father attributes change proportionally (Figure 45,
Figure 46). Future research could be conducted to better understand if the weighting of
the child attributes should be adjusted.
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Figure 45. Child Attributes on Belief Degrees (Original)

Figure 46. Child Attributes on Belief Degrees (Manually Adjusted)

IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses based on the data, itself. Users can
select Sensitivity > Change Input Data, which brings up a dialog box that produces two
side-by-side graphs (Figure 47). The first graph displays the Process Input or Score for
each grade (from the SPS data) for a selected alternative. SPS 2012 Q2 was selected,
which received the lowest number of binned process inputs (lower being worse).
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Figure 47. Input Data (Original)

The second graph displays the Process Input Score for SPS 2012 Q2 adjusted
down and its affect upon the NSC Performance for the respective time period. Other
alternatives (i.e., SPS process input data for a selected time period) or any of the other
attributes (i.e., PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) can also be explored as
desired. Although we did not drastically alter the score from the original value, we still
see a marked change in the overall NSC Performance score 2012 Q2, which increased
from 80% to 85% (Figure 48).
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Figure 48. Input Data (Adjusted)

Verification, Validation, and Accreditation
In addition to the data that were collected from the process input binning and
belief degrees survey there are also data required for the MCDA model selected. For
example, the IDS software used to implement ER requires values such as weights,
utilities, and belief degrees in order to describe the model. These values have nothing to
do with the actual assessment data, but rather are used to define the way in which the
assessment data will be integrated using the MCDA model. While future research may
expand on the in NSC Performance methodology to include approaches for determining
these values, we have assigned these values as necessary in order to complete the testing
of the NSC Performance methodology. Sensitivity analyses were conducted to determine
the impact of some of these selected values on the ER model. Further, a preliminary
verification and validation of the assessment integration model selected for the NSC
Performance methodology was also performed and is presented in the following
paragraphs. However, a more thorough Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification,
Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) will be necessary in the future.
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M&S VV&A is crucial to the development and deployment of a model or
simulation, especially if it is to be accepted and employed by stakeholders for decisionmaking with respect to NSC performance (Macal, 2005). For example, the Department
of Defense released instructions for VV&A of M&S (Department of Defense [DoD],
2009) and many other agencies have developed their own standards.
The DoD official definitions of M&S and VV&A are provided in Figure 49
(DoD, 2009).

Model

a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or
process.

Simulation

a method for implementing a model over time.

Verification

the process of determining that a model or simulation
implementation and its associated data accurately
accurately represent the developer’s conceptual
description and specifications.

Validation

Accreditation

the process of determining the degree to which the
model or simulation and its associated data are an
accurate representation of the real world from the
perspective of the intended uses.
the official certification that a model or simulation and
its associated data are acceptable to use for a specific
purpose.

Figure 49. DoD Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Definitions
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NSC Performance Model Verification
Verification ensures that a model or simulation is programmed and implemented
correctly. That is, the model should be free from errors, bugs, accidental omissions,
misapplications of the model, misapplications of the software, and invalid
implementations of any algorithms (Macal, 2005). Verification is the process of
determining whether a model is consistent from concept to requirements, including a
review of the model’s capabilities and the specifications associated with each capability.
It is important to understand that no model can ever be completely verified, so the result
of model verification is not a verified model, but rather a model that has passed all
verification tests. For the purposes of the NSC Performance Model, verifying the model
relies upon verifying the NSC Performance assessment integration method selected for
the third phase of this methodology, so ideally we would verify the ER model deployed
using IDS. Therefore, the verification plan addresses the following three questions
(Figure 50.
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Question 1

• Does the NSC Performance model satisfy
the intended use of ER?

Question 2

• Does the software code provided by IDS
correctly implement ER?

Question 3

• Does the NSC Performance model,
implemented with ER via IDS, produce the
required results in the desired format to
meet the research purpose?

Figure 50. Model Verification Questions
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Question 1
Does the NSC Performance model satisfy the intended use of ER?
In an effort to accommodate MCDA problems prone to uncertainties and
subjectivity, ER was devised, developed, and implemented via IDS by Yang, along with
his collaborators (Xu & Yang, 2001). ER and IDS are now used in many areas, such as
supply chain management, design decision support, risk and safety analysis, quality
management, and government policy consultations (Xu et al., 2005). ER uses a set of
attributes, weights, utilities, and belief degrees to assess and rank a series of alternatives.
This approach lends itself nicely to the complex problem of NSC Performance in an
operating nuclear power station which consists of a number of attributes (PA, QA, CO,
LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP), and also offers a series of alternatives in need of ranking
(Quarterly Process Input binning). ER is used to support decision analyses, assessments,
or evaluation activities. The NSC Performance Model would also be used to support
decision-making, specifically for corrective or preventive measures for degrading NSC
Performance indication. Consequently, the challenge of ranking NSC Performance based
on a set of attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) is certainly an
appropriate application of ER.
Question 2
Does the software code provided by IDS correctly implement ER?
Many MCDA problems inevitably deal with information under uncertainty, and
that is especially true when dealing with Safety Cultures with their tangible and
intangible inputs. ER provides an alternative way of handling such information
systematically and consistently. ER is a powerful MCDA approach based on a recursive
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algorithm that essentially aggregates information nonlinearly. ER has been compared to
other MCDA approaches, such as MAUT, Saaty’s left eigenvector method, Belton’s
normalized left eigenvector procedure, and Johnson’s right eigenvector procedure (J.-B.
Yang, 1999). The results of those comparisons produced comparable rankings of
alternatives. IDS has also been compared to AHP, and while both use a hierarchical
structure to model MCDA problems, there are some distinctions (Xu & Yang, 2001). For
example, ER alternatives are not part of the hierarchy like they are in AHP. AHP uses a
decision matrix whereas ER uses a generalized decision matrix that incorporates belief
degrees (which are not employed in AHP); also, AHP uses average scores from pairwise
comparisons to aggregate data, but ER aggregates the belief degrees in a progressive
manner from lower level attributes to high level attributes. Because of these distinctions,
IDS (the software implementation of ER) can: manage large and complex MCDA
problems; assess new alternatives independently; produce consistent rakings of
alternatives even after new ones are added; create a distributed assessment of alternatives
in addition to a ranking of those alternatives; assess an alternative against standards or
criteria (AHP can only compare the relative importance of alternatives between
attributes); handle mixed data models (with both qualitative and quantitative data, as well
as random and deterministic data, under uncertainty); and lastly, IDS can optionally
utilize AHP as one of its weighting approaches for attributes (Xu & Yang, 2001).
The detailed problem description, basic evaluation framework, algorithms,
axioms, and theorems utilized by ER have been presented in detail (J.-B. Yang & Xu,
2002) and demonstrate that the ER approach and IDS have sound theoretical foundations.
ER has undergone mathematical proofs (J.-B. Yang, 1999) and the mechanics of ER
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along with the results of ER deployed via IDS have been presented in a number of peerreviewed journals and conferences (Sonmez, Yang, & Holt, 2001; Wang, Yang, & Sen,
1996; Xu, 2004; Xu & Yang, 1999, 2003, 2005; Xu, Yang, & Wang, 2005; J.-B. Yang,
1999; J.-B. Yang & Xu, 2002, 2004; J. B. Yang, Dale, & Siow, 2001). Furthermore,
there is an example for which ER, using IDS, was used in the fields of corporate quality
management to produce a European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) self
assessment (Siow, Yang, & Dale, 2001). This example offers a degree of face validity for
the methodology, the model, as well as the software code, all of which translates to our
research as the NSC Performance Methodology leverages IDS to implement an integrated
safety culture health assessment based on the binned process inputs and degrees of belief
used to rank the NSC health alternatives, which is a valid application of ER.
Furthermore, as evidenced by the sensitivity analyses provided earlier, as well as the
model validations that will be provided in the next section, it has been demonstrated that
the model behaves logically, which implies that the software code is free from
mathematical errors.
Question 3
Does the NSC Performance model, implemented with ER via IDS, produce the required
results in the desired format to meet the research purpose?
The research purpose requires that the output of the NSC Performance model
provide a ranked assessment of NSC Health (Figure 3). ER is an MCDA approach,
which, like other MCDA approaches such as AHP, produces a ranked list of alternatives
as its output. The IDS software implementation of ER thus also produces a ranked list of
alternatives. The SPS Process Input Binning Data was designated as alternatives in the
NSC Performance model. The Traits of a Healthy NSC were designated as attributes in
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the model, and assigned NSC Performance as the overall father attribute. The model has
been provided with sufficient information (including attribute weights, utilities, and belief
degrees) to relate father and child attributes, as well as to relate our data (from the
process input binning and degrees of belief survey) to the attributes and alternatives. The
output of our model is, indeed, a ranked list of NSC Performance based on an integrated
NSC health assessment and thus adequately meets the needs of this research.
NSC Performance Model Validation
Validation ensures that the model is useful (Macal, 2005). That is, the model
should address the correct problem and provide accurate information about the system or
phenomenon being modeled. Validation could also consist of a series of challenges
designed to purposefully address any doubts about the application of the model, in which
case, similar to verification, the results of validation do not necessarily produce a
validated model, but rather a model that has passed all validation tests (or perhaps a
model that has failed some tests, but may be able to pass them in the future after
additional model improvements have been made). Validation of complex models
involves demonstrating that the model has the appropriate underlying relationships to
permit an acceptable representation of the real world. The validation plan addresses the
following three questions (Figure 51).
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Question 1

• Is the NSC Performance model a valid construct
to determine NSC Performance?

Question 2

• Are the results produced by the NSC Performance
model close to the results of the real world?

Question 3

• Under what range of inputs are the NSC
Performance model results useful?

Figure 51. Model Validation Questions

Question 1
Is the NSC Performance model a valid construct to determine NSC Performance?
Typically, validation requires that a newly proposed model be compared to some
existing reference model. However, no such model for NSC Performance was located
during the extensive literature review. Consequently, we will instead explore whether the
model constructed for NSC Performance is understandable with reasonable results. This
validation depends on the purpose of the model and its intended use, so it is valuable to
understand why we are using a model in the first place. In the case of the NSC
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Performance model, we are modeling NSC health as a function of the traits of a healthy
NSC, in order to make qualitative or quantitative predictions about the future. That is, to
quantify a NSC’s health performance based on the integrated performance assessment
value (produced by the NSC Performance model). In addition, the model is also used to
gain insight into how degrees of belief affect the ranking of NSC performance. The NSC
Performance model uses ER that allows us to explore all ten traits or attributes of NSC
performance (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP), as well as to explore how
those attributes interact, depending on the weights, utilities, and belief degrees supplied
for the model. The presently utilized NEI NSC model utilizes these same attributes. The
introduction of degrees of belief is now obvious after conducting this research, so the
NSC Performance model appears to be a valid construct.
Face validation is another technique for validating a model or simulation.
Essentially, face validation determines whether a model or simulation appears to measure
a certain criterion. It is often conducted via peer reviews accompanied by surveys or
interviews to seek the opinions of subject matter experts regarding the model or
simulation. ER and IDS have undergone extensive face validation by presenting the
methodology, mathematics, and software implementation in numerous peer-reviewed
journals and conference proceedings (Huynh et al., 2006; Wang, Yang, & Sen, 1996;
Yang, Dale, & Slow, 2010. Therefore, any model, which correctly implements ER and
IDS, can claim some level of transitive face validation.
Question 2
Are the results produced by the NSC Performance model close to the results of the
real world?
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In addition, comparing model predictions to historical data via benchmarking and
sensitivity analysis can also validate new models. For example, the maritime security
assessment that leverages ER and IDS validates its model with benchmarking and
sensitivity analysis (Yang, Wang, Bonsall, & Fang, 2009). Sensitivity analyses of the
NSC Performance model has been successfully conducted as stated previously in this
chapter. A benchmarking study was conducted by obtaining the subjective grading from
the existing process input binning from the Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT). These
results were then compared to the results achieved with the new model (our NSC
Performance model), based on the same data. The resulting grading from the SCRT and
the NSC Performance model were found to have fidelity with one another.
Question 3
Under what range of inputs are the NSC Performance model results useful?
A sensitivity analysis to explore different input settings of the NSC Performance
model has already been performed. The NSC Performance model has been compared to
the current SCRT process with fidelity. Consequently, a better understanding of the
effects of weights for the degrees of belief attribute on the overall father attribute of NSC
Performance has been gained. The sensitivity of the belief degrees to the selected
weights has been determined. How changing the input data impacts the degrees of belief
score has been explored. Nevertheless, additional sensitivity analysis can be conducted
to further validate the NSC Performance model.
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Figure 52. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Equal Weights Model)

The output of the NSC Performance model (the ranked NSC Performance) should
change depending on the weights selected for the child attributes. Consequently,
extreme-weighting cases will be explored to test the validity of the model by ensuring
that the results align with our assumptions and expectations. From Appendix D, we
know that PA had the highest number of binned process inputs in 2Q 2012 (PA received
an equally high value in 1Q 2013 and 3Q 2013 as well but for the sake of simplicity 2Q
2012 will be utilized) and a zero value in 2Q 2014. Consequently, if the value of PA is
changed it is expected that 2Q 2012 would be affected; however, 2Q 2014 would not be
affected as shown in Figure 52, Figure 53 and Figure 54.
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Figure 53. Minimum PA Weighting

Figure 54. Maximum PA Weighting

This weight testing is then completed for the remaining attributes to verify fidelity
and utility of range with respect to the binned process inputs.
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NSC Performance Model Accreditation
Accreditation is the final step in a full M&S VV&A process. Accreditation is
used to approve a model or simulation that has demonstrated that it can be employed
successfully and that its results would be beneficial to the decision-making process. The
entire VV&A process, but especially accreditation, would require close work with the
stakeholders or agency that would be interested in employing the model or simulation.
For the purposes of our research, we would initially look to market the NSC Performance
model to the commercial nuclear industry, and perhaps later share the approach with
other agencies (e.g., INPO, WANO, IAEA). However, direct interaction with the nuclear
industry regarding the NSC Performance model has been extremely limited. It is easy to
see how the quick visual analyses, sensitivity analyses, and preliminary verification and
validation of the model would be valuable once the NSC Performance model is deployed
in vivo with actual data and stakeholders reviewing the results to inform their decisions.
Future research would be necessary to better understand the sensitivity of the model to
the selected weights, utilities, and belief degrees selected for the model, but it is easy to
see how IDS could be useful in producing these analyses. Further, these sensitivity
analyses would be invaluable for communicating with participants and stakeholders in a
NSC Performance model integrated assessment. As evidenced by this preliminary model
testing, the NSC Performance model has the potential to integrate degrees of beliefs of
subject matter experts with binned process input data using an ER model.
In summary, it has been demonstrated that an integrated assessment methodology,
based on ER, can be employed to integrate the binned process inputs and degrees of
belief assessments. Furthermore, this methodology systematically integrates these data in
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a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible approach, and provides a ranked NSC
Performance list as its output.
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CHAPTER 5
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section discusses the summary of the findings, limitations and
recommendations for future research. This section will also explain the relevance of this
research to academia and the implications to engineering managers.

5.1 Implications
The implications to academia are to expand the current body of knowledge in the
area of nuclear safety culture health evaluation. The literature review has expanded the
body of knowledge by highlighting relevant research literature, and exploring common
themes, and identifying new conceptual models. The literature review also exposed the
considerable gap in the current body of knowledge. The research presented in this paper
furthers our understanding on the causal relationship between the process inputs and NSC
health utilizing MCDA. This research provides several avenues to expand and bolster
this area of study.
The implication to the engineering and project managers is to provide a better
functional understanding of the relationship between process inputs and NSC utilizing
MCDA in an operating commercial nuclear power station.
This research also identified areas of the NSC that had higher significant
correlations. This information better equips the manager when deciding on what areas to
focus on and perhaps most of all allows the manager to have a better actionable insight on
the relationships and interactions between the process inputs and the NSC Health.
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5.2 Recommendations
There are several important limitations that will be discussed in this section. The
sample size, while technically acceptable, was low. Eight respondents answered the
survey. A larger sample size in the range of hundreds would make the results more
generalizable. The sample size included only one nuclear power station. It is possible
that there is bias in the study to one particular industry (i.e., US commercial nuclear
power stations). Future research should account for other industrial safety cultures. The
survey was self-administered and while self-administered surveys are accepted as a
standard measurement tool, self-assessment raises concerns of source biases.
Other important areas for future research are the correlations established between
aspects of the process inputs and NSC Health. Research in the specific area of how best
practices in NSC Health are documented, socialized, and disseminated both within and
without a nuclear power station would bolster the research presented here.
5.3 Conclusions
A literature review on the performance of a nuclear safety culture in an operating
commercial nuclear power station environment was conducted. From the review it was
established that there was a large gap in the body of knowledge. A conceptual model was
built, research explored and research questions posed.
It has been established that quantitative data in the form of Process Inputs, that
have causality with NSC health, at a nuclear power station can be obtained (Question 1).
That the degrees of belief of NSC health by leadership at a nuclear power station can be
quantified for NSC health via a survey (Question 2). That MCDA can be utilized to
integrate the degrees of belief of NSC health and the process inputs into a comprehensive
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methodology to dynamically evaluate NSC Health Performance (Question 3) (Figure 55.
NSC Assessment Model with MCDA and Figure 56. NSC Assessment Model with
MCDA (Simplified View). This research has provided a more objective living NSC
management tool that provides a management team with NSC health changes
dynamically. This can lead to thoughtful discussion and cognitive analysis by the site
leadership team as to the reason for any changes in the health the NSC.

MCDA

Figure 55. NSC Assessment Model with MCDA

157

Figure 56. NSC Assessment Model with MCDA (Simplified View)
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APPENDIX C: SURRY POWER STATION SCMP MINUTES (EXAMPLE)
Surry Safety Culture Monitoring Panel
February 24, 2015
Period Reviewed:

October 1 to December 31, 2014 (4Q 2014)

Chairperson:

(Supervisor-Organizational Effectiveness T/A)

Members:

(Maintenance), (NSS), (RP), (Protection Services), (O&P), (Licensing), (Training).

Non-Members:

None.

Summary: A quorum of qualified SCMP participants was confirmed to be in attendance and the meeting was called to order at 1300.
One Root Cause Evaluation and one Apparent Cause Evaluation were performed during the fourth quarter of 2014. These and other required
materials were reviewed and binned in accordance with LI-AA-1002 (Rev 4), Safety Culture Review, section 3.4, Conduct of SCMP Meetings. The
results of this binning activity are recommendations for the Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT) to consider during their quarterly meeting.
Four of the ten Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) traits were selected during the binning activity, distributed as follow:
Six items were binned to Work Processes. Three items were binned to WP.3 (Documentation), and three were binned to WP.4 (Procedure
Adherence).
Three items were binned to Problem Identification and Resolution, with two items binned to PI.2 (Evaluation) and one item binned to PI.3
(Resolution).
Two items were binned to Personal Accountability, with both binned to PA.2 (Job Ownership).
One item was binned to Leadership Safety Values and Actions under LA.5 (Change Management).
Positive NSC traits were recommended for Questioning Attitude (four instances), as described in the attached binning matrix.
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The SCMP determined there were no emergent station issues that signaled a decline in station Nuclear Safety Culture focus (ref. LI-AA-1002,
3.4.2.d) or required immediate attention or action. No other actions were assigned and the meeting was adjourned.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM / PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT
Root Cause Evaluations (Level 1 and 2)
RCE 1128 – Surry Unit 2 Trip: Unit 2 experienced an automatic reactor trip from
100% power. Following the reactor trip troubleshooting determined the source
of the trip was a spurious opening of the ‘B’ reactor trip breaker.

Trait(s)
WP.3

Root Cause: Relay terminal screws were tightened “hand tight” (qualitative)
resulting in inconsistent torque applied to terminal screws. This inconsistency is
the result of a lack of quantitative standards for terminal screw tightness.
Apparent Cause Evaluations (Level 1 and 2)

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

Procedure adherence, (a):
“Plant activities are governed
by comprehensive, highquality programs, processes,
and procedures.” The
procedure did not include the
torque value for the relay
terminal screws.
SCMP Recommendation(s)

ACE 19845 – Evaluate the cause of EDG No. 1 circuit breaker 15H3 remote trip
and breaker-closed indication failure during performance of 1-OPT-EG-001:
The EDG #1 circuit breaker, 01-EP-BKR-15H3 EG1 panel breaker-closed
indication, became lit after the breaker opened during the performance of 1OPT-EG-001 and subsequent tests of the remote trip capability from the EG1
panel failed to trip open the breaker. This ACE will determine the most likely
cause for the failure of conductor 15H3PT1 of cable 1H3PH12.

PI.2

Evaluation, (d): “Extent of
condition and extent of cause
evaluations are completed in a
timely manner, commensurate
with the safety significance of
the issue.” Extent of condition
evaluation was insufficient.

Apparent Cause: The EDG No. 1 output circuit breaker control circuit cable
1H3PH12 conductor 15H3PT1 failed open. The most likely apparent cause of the
failed conductor is mechanical failure of the conductor due to post installation
stressors. These stressors are characterized as forces created by sharp bends at
conduit and penetration entrances and exits, as well as proximity to cable tray
edges and cable tray cover edges. This apparent cause was previously identified
by ACE019381 after adjacent cables 1H3PH11 and 1EG89 from the same cable
bundle experienced similar failures.

PI.3

Resolution, (e): “Corrective
actions prevent the recurrence
of significant conditions
adverse to quality.” Corrective
actions did not prevent
recurrence.

SCRT Comments
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CAP Trend Report – 4Q 2014 – New Potential Adverse Trends

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

From the trending of condition report trend codes, cause evaluation codes, and
INPO PO&C codes, Emergency Planning (CR flag trending) and Engineering
Fundamentals (PO&C Code) were identified as potential adverse trends.

Carry to
2Q2015

Recommend reviewing after
CA is complete (2Q2015
SCMP) to determine if trend
exists.

No NSC
concerns

SCMP determined this event
not to be a nuclear safety
culture concern.

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

CR570073: Submitted for Emergency Planning (CR flag trending)

CR570074: Submitted for Engineering Fundamentals (PO&C Code)
CA response: There were 3 CRs, in the 4th quarter 2014, with the Primary INPO
criteria Hot Button, "EN.1 - Engineering Fundamentals (INPO 12-013)." CR
570074 is currently being reviewed by engineering. CRs 563897 & 563876 were
determined by engineering to be department HU clock resets. These two CRs
were also binned in the Nov 2014 DSEM presentation as Engineering HU
Fundamental issues and aggregated on the Technical Conscience Bubble Chart
for the current INPO cycle. The Technical Conscience Bubble Chart for Dec 2014
shows a negative trend in Engineering Fundamentals for the current INPO cycle.
Actions to improve engineering performance include plans for additional
classroom training for Independent Review & Verification Practices.
Nuclear Oversight: New AFIs, Issues, and Audit Findings
AFI 14-007S – Configuration Control: In some cases, operators performing
plant activities failed to verify proper component positions or maintain positive
control of components. This has resulted in the start of a bearing cooling pump
without a suction source, operation of a circulating water pump without its
associated screen in service, and inadequate isolation of a train of the low head
safety injection system during maintenance.

WP.4

Procedure adherence, (d):
“Individuals manipulate plant
equipment only when
appropriately authorized and
directed by approved plant
procedures or work
instructions.” Work was not
always conducted in
accordance with

SCRT Comments

SCRT Comments
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PA.2

procedures/work orders.
Job ownership, (c):
“Individuals take ownership for
the preparation and execution
of assigned work activities”
was selected as all examples
may not have been driven by
procedures/work orders.

AFI 14-010-NBU – SBO Outage Preparation: In some cases, elements of Fleet
GaRD MA-AA-DQT-1001, Diesel Quality Team, were not implemented effectively
during the planning of SBO outages at all three sites in July 2014. Management
oversight and intrusiveness into the quality of the milestone deliverables and
enforcement of accountability was lacking in some instances. In addition,
inconsistent procedure knowledge and adherence was also noted across the
fleet. Contributing to this, expectations of the new NBU diesel improvement
initiative have not been effectively communicated from the site leadership team
to key station stakeholders.

WP.4

Procedure adherence, (a):
Individuals did not follow
procedures.

LA.5

Change management (e):
Managers did not
“communicate the effects of
impending changes.”

Finding 14-07-01MNS: Storage Practices utilized for Level D items have not
been effective in preventing contaminates from entering.

PA.2

Job ownership (c): Individuals
did not “take ownership for
the preparation and execution
of assigned work activities”
and stored the items
improperly.

Finding 14-07-03CMNS: The basis for selection of Critical Characteristics for
Commercial Grade Item Evaluations is not being consistently documented.

WP.3

Documentation (b): Design
documentation, procedures,
and work packages were not
“complete, thorough,
accurate, and current.”

WP.4
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Procedure adherence (e):
Individuals did not “ensure the
statuses of work activities
were properly documented.”
Finding 14-08-02MNS: National Academy Nuclear Training (NANT)
accreditation records are not identified by procedure as QA records and are not
being retained as required.
Finding 14-10-01MS: Qualification requirements for personnel to perform
concrete and grout activities has not been developed and implemented at
Millstone and Surry.

Station Management Review Meeting (SMRM) Open Items and Trends
NO new GAPS, Performance Improvement items, or trends were noted during
SMRM held 11/12/14.

SAA32611: Validate training (PAPII) for FME controls issue.
SAA32612: Provide a list and feedback to the Site VP, acting Plant Manager and
Director of Eng on the Deficient Critical Work Backlog (Non-outage)
SAA32614: Revise the Performance Measures and Goals for the GE on the
packing program
SAA32615: Ensure making additions to the RCS are to the top of VCT for
controlling H2 concentration during reactor startups is proceduralized.
SAA32616: Licensing evaluate strategy for readiness for big inspections.
SAA32617: Verify oversight of critical valve packing is planned for the upcoming
outage

NO NSC
concerns

SCMP determined this legacy
event not to be a nuclear
safety culture concern.

WP.3

Documentation, (a): These
activities are not “governed by
a comprehensive, high-quality
program, process, or
procedure.”

Trait(s)
N/A

No NSC
concerns

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

None.

None.

SCMP determined none of
these SAA/Action Items were
nuclear safety culture
concerns.
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SAA32618: Benchmark Calvert Cliffs on their elimination of TIG welding in FW
heaters as a method to help with chemistry control of the secondary.
SAA32619: Determine how lessons learned from NAPS red KPI on circuit
breakers was or was not shared with Surry and why Surry’s same KPI is green
SAA32620: During benchmarking on configuration control, include review of
configuration control KPIs
NNOE containing safety culture flag
None this quarter.
CRs flagged as “Significant Abnormal Unexplained Conditions”
None this quarter.
Results from Nuclear Safety Culture Assessments, Self-Assessments,
Benchmarking and Industry Assessments, INPO/WANO AFIs and PDs
None this quarter.
Human Performance “Good Catches”
During a cursory review of a design change (DC) that was not even assigned to
him, [Engineer] identified that the Current Transformers (CTs) for use in 4160
volt switchgear were left open-circuited. This condition would have resulted in
a catastrophic failure (i.e., explosion) inside the 4kV switchgear and possible arc
flash that could have led to personal injury or death and a likely loss of the
entire 4kV bus. This DC had been fully reviewed by the preparing architect firm
and the owner’s review completed by Dominion prior to [Engineer] identifying
the concern. It was only the extra effort by [Engineer] that prevented this
potentially very serious consequence.

Trait(s)
N/A
Trait(s)
N/A
Trait(s)
N/A
Trait(s)
POSITIVE
for QA

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

None.
SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

None.
SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

None.
SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments
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While walking down a JPM with an initial License Class Trainee, an operator
assigned to the Condensate Polishing Water Treatment crew, discovered a
discrepancy in the actuating solenoid alignment for the unit 2 Emergency
Switchgear room Halon fire protection system. The system is designed to pump
in two stages when fire is detected, the second stage 5 minutes after the first.
He noticed that the actuating solenoids were arranged such that the second
stage bottle for Zone 2 would dump along with the first stage bottles, thus
negating the second actuation for that zone. He brought this to the attention of
shift supervision, Safety & Loss Prevention and Engineering, and it was
confirmed that this sequence could not positively ensure that the required
Halon concentration would be maintained in the space for the desired duration.
This rendered Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room Halon system non-functional.
This Operator’s knowledge of plant systems, his concern over the functionality
of an installed fire protection system, and his desire to ensure the proper
response to a deviating condition are prime examples of the ‘K’, ‘N’ and ‘H’ in
the station’s THINK Human Performance model.

POSITIVE
for QA

As part of Watchstation Rounds, [Operator] identified that the slinger ring for
the outboard motor bearing of 1-BC-P-1B was not rotating. She submitted a CR
and identified the abnormality to Shift Supervision, which allowed for the
proper research and questions to be asked. 1-BC-P-1A had previously been
secured due to an upcoming scheduled work package; however, due to [the
Operator’s] diligence on Watchstation Rounds, the organization decided to
place 1-BC-P-1A in service again to allow for investigation/repair of 1-BC-P-1B
before removing 1-BC-P-1A from service. Her attention to detail helped to
prevent what could have been a potential Reactor Trip due to loss of Bearing
Cooling.

POSITIVE
for QA

During verification of the tag out for the 50 Ton Chiller, the crew went to verify
that the component was de-energized and found unexpected voltages. The crew
contacted their supervisor and Engineering for resolution to the problem. This
attention to detail and verification process of a protective barrier shows the
proper method to ensure each person’s safety. This reflects highly upon the

POSITIVE
for QA
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crew and the organization as a whole.

ENGINEERING
Red or Yellow KPI ERI (6.2) “Age of Red and Yellow Systems” window
SURR01/SURR02, 4Q2014: The age of R/Y System Health Reports > 18 months:
EDG 30 months (10 quarters). One point lost for one system (EDG) being Red /
Yellow for greater than to 18 months.

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

No NSC
concerns

SCMP determined this event
not to be a nuclear safety
culture concern.

SCRT Comments

LICENSING
NRC Quarterly Reports and new inspection findings:
Fourth Quarter 2014 NRC Integrated Inspection Report: An NRC-identified,
non-cited violation (NCV) of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4, Unit
Operating Procedures and Programs, Section A.7 was identified because Surry
procedure 0-ECM-1801-01, “Westinghouse Type BF – BFD – or NBFD65NR Relay
Replacement” did not include a torque value for the reactor protection system
(RPS) relay terminal screws to a field wiring connection. Subsequently, Unit 2
tripped on October 13, 2014, when a field wire connection became loose from
the terminal end of a RPS trip relay and caused a reactor trip breaker to open.
The issue was documented in Surry’s corrective action program (CAP) as
condition report (CR) 561820.

Trait(s)
PI.2

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

While this issue was covered
in the RCE binned previously,
PI.2 (Identification) was added
because the NRC inspection
NCV was issued after the RCE
was complete.
Evaluation, (H): “Cause
analyses identify and
understand the bases for
decisions that contributed to
issues.”

MSRC Action Items

Trait(s)

None this quarter.

N/A

SCMP Recommendation(s)
None.

SCRT Comments
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OPERATIONS
NEW Operator Work-Arounds and/or Burdens
Operator Burden – U1/2 LLIS: Biological fouling of trash racks, travelling screen
failure when swapping CW pumps, VP LCV performance, 1-VS-F-47 in manual.

Trait(s)
NO NSC
concerns

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

SCMP determined this not to
be a nuclear safety culture
concern.

HUMAN RESOURCES & EMPLOYEE CONCERNS (for SCRT review only)
Human Resources

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

Trait(s)

SCMP Recommendation(s)

SCRT Comments

NO INPUT FOR SCMP – SCRT review only
Generic ECP or SCWE issues
NO INPUT FOR SCMP – SCRT review only
Results of Culture or Organizational Effectiveness Surveys (PI-AA-100-1009)
NO INPUT FOR SCMP – SCRT review only

OTHER ITEMS FOR REVIEW
Other concerns identified by the members including identification of any
emergent issues
None identified.
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1
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Decision Making

Respectful Work
Environment
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APPENDIX D: NSCMP PROCESS INPUT BINNING RESULTS
Table 5. SPS NSCMP Process Input Binning Data

Quarter
2Q 2012
3Q 2012
4Q 2012
1Q 2013
2Q 2013
3Q 2013
4Q 2013
1Q 2014
2Q 2014
3Q 2014
4Q 2014
1Q 2015
AVG

Personal
Accountability

Questioning
Attitude

Effective Safety
Communication

Leadership
Safety
Values &
Actions

PA
6
3
4
6
6
2
5
1
0
2
2
2
3.3

QA
3
4
4
3
5
0
2
1
1
1
0
0
2.0

CO
1
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.3

LA
3
0
2
1
1
1
4
2
2
4
1
1
1.8

Decision
Making

Respectful
Work
Environment

Continuous
Learning

Problem
Identification
& Resolution

Environment
for Raising
Concerns

Work
Processes

DM
3
2
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0.9

WE
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1

CL
0
1
4
0
3
1
5
0
0
1
0
1
1.3

PI
0
0
4
1
1
4
0
0
2
1
3
2
1.5

RC
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1

WP
7
0
5
3
3
5
6
5
2
5
6
3
4.2

187
APPENDIX E: PILOT SURVEY

This pilot survey will be used to validate the proposed survey questions. The full survey
is attached. It is not necessary to answer the actual survey questions. Please read through
the question and answer the review section for that particular question. The review
section contains 5 columns. For the first 4 columns, please place an “X” in the box(s)
that are most appropriate. Each question has a place for comments on that question in the
last column labeled “Recommendations/Assessment”. Additionally, at the end of the
survey there is a general comments section. This section can be used to address the
survey in general or specific survey questions. If commenting on survey questions please
refer to the survey question number. The survey will be revised based on the inputs from
the pilot survey responses and posted on an on-line survey service. The survey will be
sent out to multiple individuals in multiple organizations that work in a nuclear power
station environment. Thank you for your time and expertise.

SURVEY
The information being requested will help academics and companies better understand
health of a nuclear safety culture in a nuclear power station environment. Analysis of the
results will be based on a combination of survey participants and cannot be traced back to
any one individual, event, or company. Individual responses will remain anonymous and
will not be reported to any person or entity. Individual responses will not be traced back
to any one individual, event, or company. Participation in this survey is voluntary, with
no penalties or reprisals for not participating or completing the survey. Please read
through the definitions prior to starting the survey and refer back to the definitions as
needed.

Definitions:
Nuclear Safety Culture:
The core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and
individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and
the environment.
Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP):
Consists of key site personnel that meet periodically to review station performance and
bin events and trends to the Traits for a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture. The primary
function of the SCMP is to periodically assess nuclear safety culture trends and identify
potential trends and/or emergent issues then roll those up to the Safety Culture Review
Team.
Nuclear Safety Monitoring Panel (NSCMP) Binning:
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The NSCMP reviews the inputs most indicative of the health of the nuclear safety culture
(e.g., Corrective Action Program, Regulatory Communications, Self Assessments, etc.) to
identify potential concerns that merit additional attention by the organization. These
inputs are then binned in one or more of the Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture.
Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT):
This is the management team that reviews the results of the SCMP and takes corrective
actions to address trends in the safety culture. The primary function of the SCRT is to
monitor and promote a healthy nuclear safety culture by conducting a reflective selfcritique of information that reflects the health of the Station’s safety culture.
1. My years of experience as a member of a Nuclear Safety Culture Review Team and/or
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 1:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

2. My position at this power station would most accurately be classified as?
Drop down menu with: Manager or above, Supervisor (Titled) or
Non-management.

Review of Question 2:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment
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3. My years of experience working in Military Nuclear Power Plants?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 3:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

4. My years of experience working in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 4:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

Individual Commitment to Safety: includes –
PA. Personal Accountability
All individuals take personal responsibility for safety. Responsibility and authority for
nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships,
positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize the overriding importance of
nuclear safety.
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QA. Questioning Attitude
Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions,
assumptions, anomalies, and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result
in error or inappropriate action. All employees are watchful for assumptions, values,
conditions, or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant safety.
CO. Safety Communication
Communications maintain a focus on safety. Safety communication is broad and
includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-level
communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and documentation. Leaders
use formal and informal communication to convey the importance of safety. The flow of
information up the organization is seen as important as the flow of information down the
organization.
Management Commitment to Safety includes:
LA. Leadership Accountability
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors. Executive
and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their
commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety message is communicated
frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders throughout the
nuclear organization set an example for safety. Corporate policies emphasize overriding
importance of nuclear safety.
DM. Decision-Making
Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough.
Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when faced with
unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders
support and reinforce conservative decisions.
WE. Respectful Work Environment
Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a respectful work environment. A
high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, in part, through timely and
accurate communication. Differing professional opinions are encouraged, discussed, and
resolved in a timely manner. Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their
concerns.
Management Systems includes:
CL. Continuous Learning
Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out, and implemented. Operating
experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well developed.
Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning and improve
performance. Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a variety of
monitoring techniques, some of which provide an independent “fresh look.”
PI. Problem Identification and Resolution
Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly
addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance. Identification and
resolution of a broad spectrum of problems, including organizational issues, are used to
strengthen safety and improve performance.
RC. Environment for Raising Concerns
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A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to
raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or
discrimination. The station creates, maintains, and evaluates policies and processes that
allow personnel to freely raise concerns.
WP. Work Processes
The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is
maintained. Work management is a deliberate process in which work is identified,
selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, and critiqued. The entire organization is
involved in and fully supports the process.
All questions pertain to an operating nuclear power station that has no emergent
conditions present.
Individual Commitment to Safety
5. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would
indicate complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 5:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

6. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would
indicate significant integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture
into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 6:
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Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

7. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would
indicate an average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal
operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 7:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

8. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would
indicate a minimal level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal
operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 8:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment
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9. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would
indicate the absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 9:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

10. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would
indicate complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 10:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

11. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would
indicate significant integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture
into normal operations?
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Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 11:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

12. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would
indicate an average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal
operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 12:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

13. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would
indicate a minimal level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal
operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 13:
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Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

14. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would
indicate an absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 14:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

15. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate
complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 15:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment
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16. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate
significant integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into
normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 16:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

17. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate an
average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 17:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

18. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate a
minimal level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+
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Review of Question 18:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

19. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate an
absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 19:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

20. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety,
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate complete
integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 20:
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Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

21. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety,
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate significant
integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal
operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 21:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

22. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety,
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate an
average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 22:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment
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23. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety,
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate a minimal
level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 23:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

Recommendations/
Assessment

24. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety,
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate an
absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?
Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+

Review of Question 24:
Question is
Question is NOT
clear/under
clear/understandable
standable

Question relates to
Nuclear Safety
Culture Performance

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE SURVEY:

Recommendations/
Assessment
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